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THE LOST PROMISE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS
Claire Raj*
Children with disabilities are among the most vulnerable students in
public schools. They are the most likely to be bullied, harassed, restrained, or segregated. For these and other reasons, they also have the
poorest academic outcomes. Overcoming these challenges requires full
use of the laws enacted to protect these students’ affirmative right to
equal access and an environment free from discrimination. Yet,
courts routinely deny their access to two such laws—the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (section 504).
Courts too often overlook the affirmative obligations contained in
these two disability rights laws and instead assume that students with
disabilities’ only legal recourse is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Regrettably the IDEA is not capable of remedying all the harms students endure. In fact, the IDEA, by its terms,
extends to only a subset of students with disabilities. Even so, courts
force all students to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before invoking remedies under the other two disability rights laws. By
narrowly construing antidiscrimination principles and ignoring the
affirmative obligations contained in disability rights laws, courts unduly restrict students’ protections under these laws.
This Article solves that problem by explaining and clarifying the nuance that drives confusion in this area: the difference between the
IDEA’s guarantee of a free appropriate public education and the ADA
and section 504’s guarantee of equal access to public education. With
that distinction clear, this Article disaggregates the types of claims
that are most often erroneously obstructed by the IDEA’s exhaustion
clause and then creates a framework that would allow courts to analyze and correctly apply the exhaustion clause. In doing so, it hopes to
remove these laws from the IDEA’s shadow and renew their promise
of equal access to educational opportunity.

* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Many thanks to the
participants of the AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education Works-in-Progress session
for their insightful feedback on this project. Thank you to my colleagues at the University of
South Carolina School of Law for their invaluable feedback, in particular Emily Suski and Ann
Eisenberg. Finally, a huge thank you to Alicia Moss, my hardworking research assistant.

933

934

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:933

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................934
I.
AN ASSORTMENT OF RIGHTS: LAWS PROTECTING
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES ..........941
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) ....942
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ...................................945
C. FAPE’s Dual Meaning .............................................................948
II.
A MISPERCEPTION OF RIGHTS: APPLYING THE IDEA’S
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE...................................................................... 949
A. Congress’s Clarification of Disability Rights..........................950
B. Lower Courts Continue to Restrict Rights..............................951
C. The Supreme Court Examines Exhaustion............................953
1. Fry: What the Supreme Court Said ................................953
2. Fry: What the Supreme Court Left Unsaid ...................955
a. Disability Rights Laws Contain a Distinct FAPE
Right ............................................................................955
b. Plain Language Matters ............................................957
c. The Past Is Not Prologue..........................................959
III.
A RESTRICTION OF RIGHTS: LOWER COURTS’ CONFUSION
CONTINUES ......................................................................................960
A. IDEA-Ineligible Students Are Forced to Exhaust..................961
B. Dually Eligible Students Are Forced to Exhaust....................965
C. Courts Misconstrue Preclusion ...............................................970
1. Conflating FAPE with Disability Discrimination ........971
2. Requiring Intent to Recover Damages...........................976
IV.
A RESURRECTION OF RIGHTS: DISAGGREGATING CLAIMS ..........978
A. Students with Eligibility Under Section 504 and the ADA .. 978
B. Students with Eligibility Under All Laws ...............................980
1. Infliction of Physical or Emotional Harm.....................980
2. Exclusion from the Educational Program .....................981
3. Denial of Equal Access.....................................................983
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................984
INTRODUCTION
Two of the nation’s most important civil rights laws affecting students
with disabilities—the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504)—have long been mischaracterized as purely antidiscrimination statutes. 1 As a result, vital components of their protective regime go overlooked. 2 Both statutes certainly
forbid schools from taking actions that would treat students with disabilities
differently than their peers. 3 In truth, this antidiscrimination principle is the
bedrock upon which both laws stand. 4 But schools and courts are missing
the breadth of key affirmative rights these laws extend to students, and thus,
the principles embodied in these important laws remain underrealized. 5
These laws’ antidiscrimination components, which this Article will refer
to as the “disability rights laws,” 6 are too often narrowly construed as only
requiring freedom from negative treatment. 7 While that definition may generally suffice outside of schools, within the context of education, antidiscrimination means not only refraining from harm but also taking affirmative
actions to ensure equality between students with disabilities as compared to
their nondisabled peers. 8 These affirmative obligations are typically over-

1. 1 PERRY A. ZIRKEL & STEVEN R. ALEMAN, SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE
SCHOOLS 5 (2d ed. 2000); see Mark C. Weber, Procedures and Remedies Under Section 504 and
the ADA for Public School Children with Disabilities, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
611, 614–17 (2012); Ruth Hocker, More Than a Consolation Prize: Using § 504 to Advance Special Education Rights, 38 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 71, 73–74 (2015). While the ADA contains several titles, this Article’s reference to the “ADA” is meant to signal a reference to Title II of the
ADA, which directly impacts public schools. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, § 201, 104 Stat. 327, 337.
2. See, e.g., N.L. ex rel. Ms. C. v. Knox Cnty. Schs., 315 F.3d 688, 695–96 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“In sum, precedent has firmly established that section 504 claims are dismissed when IDEA
claims brought on the theory of a denial of free appropriate public education are also dismissed. These holdings make sense in light of section 504’s general applicability and its status
as an anti-discrimination statute.” (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984))).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Eva N. v. Brock, 741 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.
Ky. 1990) (“[Section 504] is not a general bill of rights for the handicapped.”), aff’d, 943 F.2d 51
(6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
4. 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 (2019); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
5. See infra Part II; see also Christopher J. Walker, Note, Adequate Access or Equal
Treatment: Looking Beyond the IDEA to Section 504 in a Post-Schaffer Public School, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1563, 1566 (2006) (“Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . is a powerful, yet oftneglected, complement to the IDEA—perhaps more powerful and effective in certain instances—if it is understood and applied correctly.”); Hocker, supra note 1.
6. While some differences in the laws exist, for ease of understanding, this Article will
refer to section 504 and Title II of the ADA as the “disability rights laws” and will note any differences between obligations under each when relevant to the discussion. R.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Bd.
of Educ., No. 5:09-CV-344, 2014 WL 4277482, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2014) (“As noted by the
Sixth Circuit, ‘Title II of the ADA “shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under [§ 504] or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that
[statute].” ’ ” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 922 (6th Cir. 2016).
7. Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1119 (2010) (arguing that the ADA’s duty to accommodate is a substantial obligation requiring
accommodation up to the limit of hardship).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2019). Reasonable accommodations must
be made when necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability unless the public
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shadowed by the much larger and more comprehensive law at the intersection of education and disability—the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA). 9 The IDEA extends both procedural and substantive rights to
eligible students with disabilities. 10 Courts and scholars generally conceptualize the IDEA as the sole dictator of public schools’ obligations to eligible
students with disabilities. 11 This leaves section 504 and the ADA as underdeveloped and underused afterthoughts. 12 Critically, some courts go as far as
precluding students from invoking their rights under the disability rights
laws at all. 13
Failing to fully grasp the scope and interaction of these three disability
laws, courts routinely strip section 504 and the ADA of their original congressional intent. First, courts erroneously force students to exhaust their
IDEA rights before bringing a claim under section 504 or the ADA. 14 Second, courts misconstrue schools’ affirmative obligations under disability
rights laws and impose unfounded limits on schools’ duties to students with
disabilities. 15 Finally, courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate intent to assert
claims under section 504 and the ADA when no such showing is actually
needed. 16 While the last two impediments to the viability of section 504 and
the ADA have been explored by scholars, courts’ continued misapplication

entity can demonstrate that the modifications would result in a “fundamental alteration” of the
service, program, or activity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2019); see McPherson v. Mich. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1997). Likewise, a school may not treat a disabled student differently, unless that differential treatment is shown to be necessary for the individual. 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(c) (2019); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(1)(iv) (2019).
9. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.
10. Id. See generally MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION (5th ed.
2019).
11. Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases,
16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 3 (2010) (“Section 504 and the ADA have often been viewed as
supplemental causes of action in special education cases, used mostly when a student who is
eligible for services under IDEA has a plausible claim for damages relief.”).
12. Id.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. Compare Letter from Off. of C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Perry A. Zirkel (Aug. 23,
1993), in 20 IDELR 134 (1993) [hereinafter Response to Inquiry of Professor Perry A. Zirkel]
(rejecting reasonable accommodation limits on accommodations as applicable to public primary and secondary schools), with Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that section 504 obligations are limited to reasonable accommodations), Barnett v.
Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991) (deeming proposed modification requesting resource-intensive program in school district unreasonable and not required by section
504), and Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that section 504 only requires
reasonable accommodations).
16. Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1417 (2015) (arguing that courts should not impose an intent burden in section
504 and ADA cases for liability or monetary relief).
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of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause is ripe for discussion. 17 This Article is the
first to offer a comprehensive examination of misplaced restrictions on disability rights claims and identify a novel approach for sorting and analyzing
such claims that is consistent with congressional intent. 18
Courts’ confused application of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause is, in many
respects, understandable. The IDEA requires plaintiffs to exhaust the statute’s administrative remedies prior to filing claims under other applicable
laws. 19 But, exhaustion is only triggered when a plaintiff seeks a remedy for
the denial of a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as guaranteed by
the IDEA. 20 What most courts miss, however, is that disability rights laws
also contain a right to FAPE and that while obligations under all three laws
overlap, they are not entirely coextensive. Thus, a necessary first step—and
one completely ignored by most courts—is identifying which FAPE right the
plaintiff intends to invoke.
FAPE, as defined in the IDEA, is a substantive standard of education
owed to eligible students with disabilities. 21 More specifically, schools are
tasked with providing an educational program individually tailored to enable
a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. 22

17. See, e.g., David L. Dagley & Charles W. Evans, Annotation, The Reasonable Accommodation Standard for Section 504-Eligible Students, 97 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1995); Kristin L.
Lingren, Comment, The Demise of Reasonable Accommodation Under Section 504: Special Education, the Public Schools, and an Unfunded Mandate, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 633; Hocker, supra
note 1; Ronald D. Wenkart, Annotation, Section 504: A Reasonable Accommodation Standard
or an Unfunded Mandate for Special Education Services?, 116 EDUC. L. REP. 531 (1997); Weber,
supra note 16 (arguing that courts should not impose an intent burden in section 504 and
ADA cases for liability or monetary relief).
18. See Ruth Colker, Did the Fry Decision Under the IDEA Overturn Rowley?, 46 J.L. &
EDUC. 443, 444 (2017) (exploring Fry’s reach as it relates to the ADA’s communication regulation and arguing Fry may have overturned Rowley); Robert Garda, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools: Finding A Middle Ground, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 459 (2017) (arguing that while Fry
expanded access to section 504 and ADA claims, it did not liberalize access to courts or school
liability as much as it could have); Terry Jean Seligmann, Flags on the Play: The Supreme Court
Takes the Field to Enforce the Rights of Students with Disabilities, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 480
(2017) (arguing that Endrew F. and Fry suggest “a continued willingness by the Court to work
at discerning and carrying out the purposes of congressional actions”); Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate Education”: Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 539, 540 (2017) (exploring the possible impact that Fry and
Endrew F. may have on courts seeking to further refine, and define, the meaning of an “appropriate education” within the context of the IDEA); Katherine Bruce, Comment, Vindication for
Students with Disabilities: Waiving Exhaustion for Unavailable Forms of Relief After Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 987 (2018) (arguing that exhaustion should not
be required when a plaintiff alleges a denial of FAPE but seeks remedies outside of the IDEA).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
20. Id.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9); Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137
S. Ct. 988, 995 (2017) (“[T]he Court nonetheless made clear that the Act guarantees a substantively adequate program of education to all eligible children.”).
22. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (“When a child is fully integrated in the regular classroom, as the Act prefers, what that typically means is providing a level of instruction reasona-
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Hence, the IDEA’s FAPE obligation is inward looking. It tasks schools with
evaluating a child’s individual needs and developing a program of special
education and related services designed to address those needs in an effort to
ensure progress toward individualized goals. 23 While its many protections
undoubtedly help to safeguard students with disabilities’ educational rights,
the law has limits. It is, in part, these very limits that make access to section
504 and the ADA so vital.
Critically, the disability rights laws impose a separate FAPE obligation
on schools, and this obligation is outward looking. That is, the laws obligate
schools to meet the needs of students with disabilities “as adequately as” the
needs of nondisabled students. 24 Thus, the standard is a comparative one,
requiring schools to take stock not just of an individual child’s needs but also
of her peer’s educational access to determine whether equal access to the educational program is being achieved. 25 These laws require schools to provide
students with disabilities the educational support and services necessary to
ensure equal access to educational opportunity. 26 To be clear, section 504’s
FAPE regulation does not demand equal educational outcomes, but it does
demand equality of access. 27 In short, the IDEA’s FAPE obligation demands
adequacy while the disability rights laws demand equality.
The IDEA’s exhaustion clause was not designed to eliminate students’
rights to these distinct forms of FAPE or preference one over the other. 28 In
fact, Congress enacted the current exhaustion clause as a repudiation of an
earlier Supreme Court ruling that declared the IDEA to be the “exclusive avenue” through which a plaintiff could pursue disability-based discrimination
in an educational program. 29 The statute’s plain language unambiguously
states that nothing in the IDEA should be read to restrict or limit the rights
or remedies available under those laws or other federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities, except that plaintiffs “seeking relief that is

bly calculated to permit advancement through the general curriculum.”). If a child is not capable of meeting grade level norms, a school must still ensure that the child’s goals are “appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances.” Id.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(d); Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
25. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Educational Equality for Children with Disabilities: The 2016
Term Cases, 2016–2017 AM. CONT. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 17, 42–45; Weber, supra note 11, at 5.
26. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019); Response to Inquiry of Professor Perry A. Zirkel, supra
note 15.
27. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008).
28. Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796; S.
REP. NO. 99-112, at 2 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 4, 15 (1985).
29. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984) (“[W]here the EHA is available to a
handicapped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based either on the
EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim.”). At
the time of the case, the IDEA was called the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). To
avoid confusion, this Article will refer to the statute by its current name.

March 2021]

The Lost Promise of Disability Rights

939

also available under [the IDEA]” must first exhaust IDEA’s administrative
remedies. 30
In an effort to resolve ongoing uncertainties, the Supreme Court recently explored the contours of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause in Fry v. Napoleon
Community Schools. 31 Unfortunately, the majority’s opinion may have actually produced more confusion than clarity. 32 While the Fry Court recognized
that some students were needlessly being prevented from asserting claims
under section 504 and the ADA, it ultimately gave the disability rights laws
too cramped a reading. It directed courts to focus on the “gravamen[] of
the . . . complaint.” 33 If the complaint is essentially about FAPE, IDEA’s exhaustion clause applies. If FAPE is not at issue, exhaustion is not required,
and the disability rights claims can proceed.
While simple on their face, these instructions do not match the substance of the rights that the statutes protect. In arriving at this test, the Court
missed a fundamental point: the existence of dual FAPE obligations under
competing statutes. The IDEA assures FAPE in the form of an individualized
right to progress. Section 504 and the ADA assure FAPE in the form of a
comparative right to equality of access. The Court’s failure to recognize the
separate and distinct right to equality-of-access claims has effectively
stripped students with disabilities of that right under section 504 and the
ADA—the exact thing the IDEA’s exhaustion clause warned against.
Following the lead of the Court’s overly simplistic litmus test, lower
courts have restricted students’ right to sue in any number of different situations. They have forced students asserting section 504 and ADA equality-ofaccess rights to exhaust IDEA remedies when they were not even eligible for
or seeking IDEA protections. 34 They have required students attempting to
remedy discrimination under section 504 and the ADA to exhaust IDEA
procedures merely because the allegations occurred in schools. 35 Finally,

30. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
31. 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017).
32. See infra Part II.
33. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752.
34. S.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir.
2018) (holding exhaustion required when student with multiple medical issues including
asthma challenged accommodations in his 504 plan); Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877
F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding exhaustion required for student with postconcussive
syndrome even after school determined that child was not IDEA eligible); L.G. ex rel. G.G. v.
Bd. of Educ., 775 F. App’x 227, 229 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding exhaustion required for student
with E. coli infection who was approved for a 504 plan and subsequently brought a 504 claim
for denial of services); Nelson ex rel. C.N. v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 589
(8th Cir. 2018) (holding exhaustion required when child with PCOS and depression brought a
claim for access to an online school program); J.Q. v. Wash. Twp. Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 3d
241, 243 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding exhaustion required when a plaintiff brought a claim alleging
school’s failure to identify child with ADHD for section 504 accommodations).
35. J.L. ex rel. Leduc v. Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist., 722 F. App’x 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2018)
(holding exhaustion required when a plaintiff brought allegations of physical abuse as a result
of an unlawful restraint method resulting in bruising on legs); see also J.M. ex rel. McCauley v.
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courts have gone so far as to preclude disability rights claims when plaintiffs
were unsuccessful in winning an IDEA claim. 36 In other words, bring your
IDEA claims before your 504 and ADA claims, but if you lose under the
IDEA, you lose under all three statutes. 37 The real-world effect for students is
at best delayed access to critical educational supports and at worst no access
at all. 38
The Supreme Court’s thin analysis combined with lower courts’ interpretation of it has had a chilling effect on students’ ability to assert disability
rights claims and, in turn, hold schools accountable for disability-based educational harms. This chilling effect can be broken down into two broad categories: (1) students without IDEA rights who seek to assert section 504 and
ADA equality-of-access claims; and (2) students with rights under all three
laws, but who only seek to assert disability-rights-law claims. In both categories, students with disabilities who should be able to access section 504 and
the ADA’s protections are effectively denied them. 39
This Article seeks to resurrect disability rights laws’ promise to protect
students with disabilities by offering an alternate analysis to IDEA’s exhaustion clause—one that acknowledges section 504 and the ADA’s distinct
FAPE obligation. It disaggregates the types of claims that are most often erroneously obstructed by the exhaustion clause and creates a framework that
allows courts to more easily sort and analyze the appropriate application of
the exhaustion clause. In doing so, it hopes to remove these laws from the
IDEA’s shadow and renew their promise to ensure students with disabilities
have equal access to educational opportunity.
Part I describes the three laws impacting the rights of students with disabilities in schools—the IDEA, section 504, and the ADA—and explores the
scope of all three, comparing rights and remedies available under each. Part
II investigates the history of IDEA’s exhaustion clause, beginning with its

Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding exhaustion required when
a plaintiff brought a claim for unauthorized use of physical restraints and isolation); Parent/Pro. Advoc. League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 26 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that class
of students alleging Olmstead violation based on segregation and isolation of students with
mental health disabilities had to exhaust under the IDEA).
36. Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 886 F.3d 75, 83–85 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff’s ADA claim was precluded because the IDEA hearing officer (IHO) found no denial of
FAPE); Smith v. Rockwood R-VI Sch. Dist., 895 F.3d 566, 569–70 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the plaintiff should have exhausted administrative remedies under the IDEA when bringing a
claim alleging that the IDEA violation amounted to disability discrimination under section 504
and the ADA); Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No 3:17-CV-1284-B, 2018 WL 1899296, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2018) (Title IX case).
37. See generally Pollack, 886 F.3d at 75. Importantly, not all of these flawed circuit court
decisions correctly applied the Supreme Court’s Fry guidance. That is, a more nuanced understanding of Fry’s guidance may have led to an appropriate outcome in some instances. Yet, the
very fact that so many circuits are misapplying the exhaustion clause suggests that the Supreme
Court’s guidance is at best confusing.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part II.
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enactment and describing courts’ confused application of the clause leading
up to the Supreme Court’s Fry opinion. It then exposes the gaps in the
Court’s Fry analysis. Part III discusses Fry’s fallout—lower courts’ continued
confusion and restriction of rights. It identifies three categories of disability
rights claims that are routinely and erroneously thwarted by IDEA’s exhaustion clause: (1) students without IDEA eligibility seeking to assert section
504 and ADA equality-of-access claims; (2) students with IDEA eligibility
seeking to assert disability-discrimination claims; and (3) students with previously litigated IDEA claims who are prevented, by issue and claim preclusion, from stating section 504 and ADA claims. Part IV offers a solution that
disaggregates common disability rights claims and establishes a framework
by which courts can recognize viable claims and prevent the unnecessary restriction of students’ rights.
I.

AN ASSORTMENT OF RIGHTS: LAWS PROTECTING EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES

Children with disabilities in schools have distinct rights under three separate federal statutes: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 40 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 41 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 While all three laws seek to ensure
that students with disabilities can have meaningful access to educational opportunities, parents, schools, and even courts are often confused about the
scope of each law as well as how the three laws intersect with one another. 43
Section 504 was one of the first civil rights laws enacted to protect people with disabilities from discrimination. 44 It was authorized as part of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but regulations for the law were not implemented
until 1977, and only after impressive and sustained political pressure from
disability rights activists. 45 Shortly thereafter, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, the precursor to the IDEA, was passed in 1975 to “assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a free
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs[ and] to assure that the

40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165.
43. See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing confusion of both family and court when both assumed that alleging a violation of the IDEA FAPE
requirement is sufficient to allege a violation of section 504).
44. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[Section 504] was the first
broad federal statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”).
45. Kitty Cone, A Short History of the 504 Sit In, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND,
https://dredf.org/504-sit-in-20th-anniversary/short-history-of-the-504-sit-in/ [https://perma
.cc/T4DV-CSFL].
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rights of handicapped children . . . are protected.” 46 More than a decade later,
in 1990, the ADA was passed to expand the reach of section 504 and, perhaps, as a reaction to what was viewed as section 504’s inability to ensure
comprehensive protections for individuals with disabilities. 47
While rights and remedies under all three laws overlap, critical—and
sometimes overlooked—differences exist. The following Section provides a
brief overview of each relevant law, as well as the rights and potential remedies contained therein, in order to better situate a more nuanced discussion
of interactions among all three laws.
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
The IDEA obligates public schools to ensure that all eligible students
with disabilities receive a substantive level of education, defined as a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE). 48 FAPE is conferred through an individualized education program (IEP), which, in turn, has its own highly specific criteria. 49 In order to be eligible for IDEA services, a child must meet
the statute’s definition of a “child with a disability,” meaning he or she must
fall into one of the thirteen recognized categories of disability, the disability
must adversely impact education, and the child must need special education
and related services as a result. 50 The IDEA’s disability categories are legal
definitions, not medical definitions of disability, and they are not without
controversy. 51

46. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3,
§ 601(c), 89 Stat. 773, 775. The EAHCA is technically an amendment to the 1970 Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA), which had provided grants for states to provide special education
services. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
47. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213); Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Movement Perspective, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND
(1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/publications/the-history-of-the-ada/ [https://perma.cc
/2CBW-EARY].
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA is essentially a grant-making statute that originated as Spending Clause legislation. When states agree to its terms, they receive federal dollars to support the cost of special education services. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.
49, 51 (2005) (“The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act) is a Spending
Clause statute that seeks to ensure that ‘all children with disabilities have available to them a
free appropriate public education . . . .’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A))). The Spending Clause authorizes the federal government to spend money to
support the “general Welfare.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); see also Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch.
Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (clarifying the obligations that the FAPE requirement
imposes on school districts’ IEPs).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2019).
51. See Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 102–22 (2009).
Intellectual disability, emotional disturbance, and specific learning disability are subjectively
measured and thus prone to bias on the part of evaluators, as evidenced by the overrepresentation of minority children who make up these categories. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New
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The IDEA’s purpose is to ensure that all children with disabilities receive
special education and related services designed to meet their “unique”
needs. 52 Each eligible child has a right to FAPE delivered through an IEP that
must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 53 The IEP describes the child’s current educational and functional needs, targets specific and measurable
annual goals, and lists the specialized instruction and related supports that
will be provided so a child can advance toward those goals. 54 Thus, FAPE
under the IDEA is a highly individualized notion that obligates schools to
ensure that an individual child is making progress that is tied to his or her
unique needs and educational goals. 55
The IDEA has a comprehensive administrative due process structure
that gives eligible students and their parents the right to bring complaints
about anything related to identification, evaluation, or placement or the provision of FAPE before an independent hearing officer. 56 The law tasks state
departments of education with managing an administrative review process. 57
Hearing officers are appointed and tasked with making determinations
about the provision of FAPE. 58 These complaints can range from issues of
IDEA: Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 1071, 1087–88 (2005); see also Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction
of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237. If by virtue of eligibility for special education services, students improved their educational outcomes, such overrepresentation would warrant
minimal concern. Unfortunately, data illustrates that students with special education needs
(and particularly students receiving services under the category of emotional disturbance)
achieve markedly less educational success. SHARON VAUGHN, LOUIS DANIELSON, REBECCA
ZUMETA & LYNN HOLDHEIDE, JOBS FOR THE FUTURE, DEEPER LEARNING FOR STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES 3 (2015), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED560790.pdf [https://perma.cc/36U3S6FW] (“According to the most recent [National Assessment of Educational Progress] (NCES
2013), 38–45 percent of students without disabilities performed at the proficient level or above
in reading and mathematics in fourth and eighth grade, while a mere 8–17 percent of students
with disabilities did so . . . .”).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).
53. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 991. The Endrew F. decision clarified another Supreme
Court decision on the meaning of FAPE—Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the Court held that “a ‘free appropriate public education’ consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique
needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child
‘to benefit’ from the instruction.” 458 U.S. at 188–89. The Court did not overturn Rowley in
Endrew F. but merely sought to clarify its interpretation of the IDEA’s FAPE standard, since in
the decades after Rowley circuit courts had varying interpretations of FAPE. See Endrew F., 137
S. Ct. at 998.
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II), (IV).
55. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(III).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), (g). Placement refers to where the child will receive special
education services. The IDEA requires that students with disabilities receive services in the
least restrictive environment, meaning a regular education setting. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
57. Id. § 1415(a).
58. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A). Hearing officers are tasked with making decisions on substantive grounds. Violations of process can only rise to the level of a denial of FAPE in limited cir-
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timely identification of children with a disability and the substance of the
special education supports in the IEP to the placement of a child in a segregated setting or the disciplinary exclusion of a child. 59 Remedies are broad as
the statute gives courts the authority to grant whatever relief they deem appropriate. 60 However, most courts draw a hard line at money damages. 61
They limit relief to compensatory damages in the form of educational services and reimbursement of out-of-pocket educational costs. 62
While Congress sought to ensure parents’ ability to hold schools accountable by including this explicit private right of action in the law, it also
stipulated that before heading directly to federal courts, parents must first
exhaust administrative remedies. 63 Thus, the IDEA includes an exhaustion
clause, which requires plaintiffs “seeking relief that is also available under
[the IDEA]” to first exhaust IDEA’s administrative procedures prior to invoking other federal laws protecting the rights of students with disabilities. 64
The purpose of exhaustion has been described as placing “those with specialized knowledge—education professionals—at the center of the decisionmaking process.” 65 Additional goals of exhaustion more generally include
“allow[ing] administrative agencies an opportunity to correct their own errors” 66 and acknowledging that agencies, not courts, “ought to have primary
responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.” 67 However, exhaustion under the IDEA has long been mired in controversy, in part due to the complicated interplay of the second set of disability
rights laws that offer protections for many students with disabilities. 68 The
following section tells the story of those laws and seeks to lay the groundwork for a discussion about the interaction of all three.

cumstances. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Hearing officers can order school districts to comply with
procedural requirements, but such procedural violations will not always rise to the level of a
denial of FAPE. See id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii).
59. Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A).
60. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
61. Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Sellers ex rel.
Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 525 (4th Cir. 1998)) (noting that money damages are not
available under the IDEA).
62. A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007); Diaz-Fonseca v.
Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2006); Ortega v. Bibb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321,
1325 (11th Cir. 2005); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 2002); Thompson ex
rel. Buckhanon v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574, 580 (8th Cir. 1998); Sellers ex
rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 525 (4th Cir. 1998); Charlie F. ex rel. Neil v. Bd. of Educ.,
98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
64. Id.
65. Frazier, 276 F.3d at 60.
66. P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 115 F.3d 100,
104 (1st Cir. 1997).
67. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).
68. See infra Section II.B.
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B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act
In contrast to the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA apply to all individuals, not just students, who meet the statutes’ relevant definition of disability. 69 Both provide, in slightly different words, that “[n]o . . . qualified indiindividual with a disability . . . shall. . . . by reason of her or his disability[] be
excluded from the participation in[ or] be denied the benefits of” the services, programs or activities of a public entity receiving federal aid, or “be
subjected to discrimination” by these entities.” 70
Section 504’s purpose was to prohibit disability discrimination in not
just federal government programs but also programs receiving federal government funding. 71 The ADA expanded the antidiscrimination prohibition
to all public organizations. 72 The ADA has several chapters, but this Article
will focus on Title II as it is the most relevant to public schools. 73 Because the
ADA was in large part modeled after section 504, adopting section 504’s eligibility parameters and patterning its regulations after section 504, the two
laws are often read in concert. 74 The remainder of this Article will refer to
the two laws jointly as the “disability rights laws,” where no distinction between the rights or remedies exists between the two. 75
There are several significant differences between the disability rights
laws and the IDEA. The first relates to eligibility for protections under the
laws. The second relates to rights and the remedies that follow. Each will be
discussed in turn.
Unlike the IDEA, where eligibility is limited to thirteen legally defined
categories of disability, the disability rights laws offer protections to any
“otherwise qualified” individual (1) with a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) with a record of
such an impairment; or (3) who is regarded as having such an impairment. 76
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
71. Section 504’s purpose was “to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize
employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society.” 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132.
73. See id. §§ 12131–12165.
74. E.g., Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 115 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“ ‘To effectuate its sweeping purpose,’ Congress designed the ADA to fit hand in glove with
the RA, leaving intact the ‘scope of protection . . . under [section 504].’ ” (citation omitted)
(first quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001); and then quoting Menkowitz
v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr. (3d Fir. 1998))).
75. When evaluating a discrimination claim under both section 504 and Title II of the
ADA, “[b]ecause these provisions involve the same substantive standards, [courts] analyze
them together.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 565 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 728 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
analyze [plaintiff’s] ADA claim by reference to section 504’s standards. . . .”)).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(a)(1) (2019).
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Congress intended this definition to be broad and, accordingly, indicated
that the focus should be on whether discrimination occurred, not on an exhaustive analysis of whether the individual has a disability. 77 Thus, the disability rights laws cover many more students than the IDEA. 78 Further, to be
“otherwise qualified” within the context of K–12 education, a child only
needs to meet the age requirements that a state has prescribed for eligibility
into the public education system. 79
Students with eligibility under disability rights laws gain significant affirmative protections rooted in the laws’ mandate requiring schools to ensure meaningful access to public education. 80 Schools must identify and
locate students with potential disabilities, evaluate students with disabilities
who may require special education or related services, and ensure such students are educated with their nondisabled peers whenever appropriate. 81 Just
like the IDEA, disability rights laws require that schools provide students
with disabilities a FAPE, but in the regulations implementing section 504,
FAPE is defined as “regular or special education and related . . . services . . . designed to meet [students with disabilities’ educational
needs] as adequately as the needs of [their peers].” 82 Finally, as with the
IDEA, the disability rights laws task schools with establishing procedural
safeguards for parents of students with disabilities so that they can enforce
these rights. 83 Unlike the IDEA, they do not require exhaustion of those
remedies before proceeding to federal court with a claim. 84
Rights and remedies under the disability rights laws can vary from those
found under the IDEA. While the IDEA’s rights and remedies flow from a

77. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1) (2019); 154 CONG. REC. S9626 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Reid) (concerning the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of
2008).
78. See ADA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The
ADAAA specifically stated that the broad eligibility analysis should be applied to both section
504 and ADA coverage, as the definition for a “qualified individual with a disability” is the
same under both laws.
79. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(2) (2019) (“With respect to public preschool elementary, secondary, or adult educational services, a handicapped person (i) of an age during which nonhandicapped persons are provided such services, (ii) of any age during which it is mandatory
under state law to provide such services to handicapped persons, or (iii) to whom a state is required to provide a free appropriate public education under section 612 of the Education of the
Handicapped Act.”).
80. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33–104.36
(2019). While there are some differences in the regulations implementing each section 504 and
Title II, Title II specifically states that it “shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than
the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.103 (2019). Further, Title II has been interpreted to adopt section 504 standards in areas where Title II has not
adopted a different standard.
81. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32–104.35 (2019).
82. Id. § 104.33.
83. Id. § 104.36.
84. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 754 (2017).
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school’s obligation to confer FAPE, section 504 and ADA remedies stem
from the right to be free from disability-based discrimination. 85 Discrimination under these laws can take a variety of forms. Students can allege disability harassment when they are subjected to physical or verbal abuse by school
officials or peers with the knowledge of school officials. 86 Students can bring
retaliation claims if they can demonstrate they suffered an adverse action after engaging in a protected activity such as advocating for their rights under
disability laws. 87 Students can also allege a denial of FAPE—essentially, that a
school failed to provide them with equal access to the educational program. 88
These accessibility claims can center on the prevention of access to physical
space, such as when a school refuses to permit a child to have a service animal in school. 89 But such claims can also arise from a failure to provide special education, supportive services, or accommodations where necessary to
ensure equal access to the educational program. 90 While the former stands
apart from any claim that could be brought under the IDEA, the latter can
overlap with IDEA’s FAPE guarantee. Both center on alleged inadequacies of
the educational program and argue that such inadequacies result in a denial
of FAPE. This overlap in protections has caused confusion in lower courts’
application of the exhaustion clause and ultimately led to a restriction of access to section 504 and ADA remedies.
When courts fail to appropriately disentangle disability rights claims
from IDEA claims, they needlessly restrict access to important remedies,
limiting plaintiffs’ ability to ensure fair treatment and hold bad actors accountable. Remedies under disability rights laws can be equitable or legal,
spanning from requests for injunctive relief to declaratory relief to money

85. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132.
86. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1079, 1085–86 (2002) (arguing that disability harassment constitutes discrimination that
violates section 504 and its implementing regulations). “Harassment excludes students with
disabilities from the educational environment provided to students without disabilities and
discourages students with disabilities from continuing their education beyond the minimum
period required by law.” Id. at 1095.
87. Title II regulations prohibit retaliation at 28 C.F.R. § 35.134. Regulations made applicable to section 504 impose a similar duty. 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 (incorporating by reference
antiretaliation provisions of 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e)). To state a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA and section 504, an individual must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the two. T.B.
ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 472–73 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for retaliation claims under the ADA).
88. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1), (7) (a public entity must make “reasonable modifications”
to its “policies, practices, or procedures” when necessary to avoid discrimination); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1985) (interpreting section 504 to require certain
“reasonable” modifications in order to “accommodate” persons with disabilities).
89. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 743.
90. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008).
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damages. 91 Because money damages are not available under the IDEA, plaintiffs who have rights under both laws may elect to pursue claims under section 504 and the ADA when equitable relief does not fully negate the harms
they or their children experienced. 92 For example, an IDEA-eligible child
who was physically harmed when a teacher attempted to restrain her may
allege that the school denied her a FAPE under the IDEA by not properly
following the IEP that banned restraints. The child’s parents may also allege
a disability discrimination claim under disability rights laws, alleging that the
assault constitutes disability discrimination by subjecting the child to unequal treatment based on her disability. Here, the plaintiff seeks monetary
damages to acknowledge the harm suffered and to deter the school from engaging in this conduct again. The child has distinct rights and remedies under both sets of laws. However, many courts will restrict access to section 504
and ADA remedies by forcing this hypothetical student to exhaust IDEA’s
administrative remedies first. 93
Courts’ unwarranted restriction of access to section 504 and ADA remedies is rooted in a failure to acknowledge the full panoply of rights contained
within these laws—in particular, the reticence to acknowledge section 504’s
distinct FAPE obligation. Courts erroneously assume that the IDEA’s FAPE
guarantee is robust enough to remedy plaintiffs’ complaints. But as explored
below, distinctions in FAPE rights can lead to meaningful differences in
schools’ obligations to students with disabilities.
C. FAPE’s Dual Meaning
While both the IDEA and the disability rights laws confer a right to
FAPE, the concept has two distinct meanings. The IDEA’s right to FAPE is
the right to an individualized plan of special education supports and services
designed to ensure students’ progress toward personalized goals. 94 The student is measured against herself rather than others. Section 504, in contrast,
defines FAPE comparatively. It tasks schools with gauging whether the needs
of students with disabilities are met as adequately as those of their nondisabled peers. 95 Put differently, the IDEA’s FAPE obligation is inward looking,
while section 504’s is outward looking.
Although section 504’s FAPE standard has been criticized as being too
difficult to measure, no court has found it to be an unauthorized regula-

91. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (providing for injunctive relief or
money damages).
92. See Weber, supra note 11, at 3.
93. For a nonhypothetical example, see Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d
989 (7th Cir. 1996).
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV); Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty.
Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
95. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (2019).
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tion. 96 Thus, public schools must ensure that they are meeting FAPE obligations under both the IDEA and section 504 for all qualifying students with
disabilities.
The ADA does not contain a FAPE obligation. However, Congress
mandated that its regulations be consistent with all section 504 regulations. 97
Further, the ADA clearly states that its regulations should not be construed
to apply a lesser standard than section 504’s regulations, unless explicitly
stated. 98 Thus, the ADA, while not adopting its own FAPE regulation, at the
very least does nothing to undermine section 504’s FAPE obligation.
Practically speaking, public schools will need to ensure they are meeting
IDEA’s right to an individualized program designed to confer reasonable
progress and the disability rights laws’ entitlement to equality of educational
access. But thus far, many courts have failed to acknowledge these two distinct rights and rather conflated claims about educational programs and
claims about IDEA’s conceptualization of FAPE. 99 By labeling these claims
IDEA FAPE claims and forcing exhaustion, courts restrict access to section
504 and ADA remedies.
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to clarify application
of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause, but as this Article demonstrates, by failing
to fully address the broad scope of disability rights laws, the Court only further muddied the waters, leading to a continued restriction of access to disability rights laws’ remedies. The following Part will discuss the IDEA’s
exhaustion clause and unpack the Supreme Court’s recent analysis of it.
II.

A MISPERCEPTION OF RIGHTS: APPLYING THE IDEA’S EXHAUSTION
CLAUSE

Because all three statutes intersect, courts are often confused about how
the three laws interact with each other, and at times this confusion results in

96. See Professor Weber’s discussion of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion that the “as adequately” standard is unworkable:
The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems undoubtedly
differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of factors that might affect a
particular student’s ability to assimilate information presented in the classroom. The requirement that States provide “equal” educational opportunities would thus seem to
present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.

Weber, supra note 11, at 14 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982)). But see
Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 419 n.8 (D.D.C. 1993).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
98. 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (2019); see also Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med.,
900 F.3d 104, 117 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We conclude that, although the statutes may diverge as to
the entities they cover and remedies they provide, they impose the same substantive liability
standard and require a unified approach to the ‘reasonableness’ of accommodations and modifications.”).
99. See infra Part IV.
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a deprivation of access to remedies under the disability rights laws. 100 Central
to the confusion is the IDEA’s exhaustion clause and its reliance on the concept of FAPE. 101 The Supreme Court recently clarified the IDEA’s exhaustion clause, but it did so without acknowledging the full breadth of rights
under section 504 and the ADA—specifically, the right to equal access of the
educational program. 102 This Part will begin with background on the IDEA’s
exhaustion clause and then unpack the Supreme Court’s Fry opinion, noting
significant gaps in the Court’s analysis.
A. Congress’s Clarification of Disability Rights
The IDEA’s exhaustion clause was enacted in 1986 as a response to a
Supreme Court ruling that held that the IDEA was the “exclusive avenue”
through which a child or their parents could pursue a claim about disabilitybased discrimination in an educational program. 103 The Court essentially
held that the IDEA eclipsed all actions under section 504 and the ADA, citing to the IDEA’s “elaborate procedural mechanism” designed to address
challenges to the adequacy of education. 104
Congress responded by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection
Act of 1986, which essentially overturned the Supreme Court’s opinion. 105
The Act amended the IDEA to add its current exhaustion requirement,
which states:
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . , [section 504], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing
of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under
[the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to
the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under
[the IDEA]. 106

Thus, Congress explicitly rejected the notion that the IDEA was the exclusive
avenue for relief for students with disabilities and “reaffirm[ed] . . . the viability” of federal statutes like section 504 and the ADA “as separate vehicles
for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.” 107

100. See Weber, supra note 86, at 1083 (discussing how courts routinely dismissed claims
based on disability harassment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
101. See Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2011) (cataloguing
different circuits’ understandings of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause).
102. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
103. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
104. Id. at 1010.
105. Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
107. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 4 (1985).
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B. Lower Courts Continue to Restrict Rights
Despite this seemingly straightforward plain language, lower courts
struggled with proper application of the IDEA’s exhaustion clause. Several
circuits held that exhaustion turned on the nature of the harms—when
harms were generally educational, IDEA exhaustion was required. 108 Others
held that exhaustion was required whenever IDEA could have adequately
provided relief for the alleged educational harms, despite the plaintiff’s failure to “seek remedies” under the IDEA. 109 Still others took the exact opposite
approach: they recognized a path forward for section 504 and ADA discrimination claims without requiring exhaustion even when harms were related
to education. 110 These courts deferred to plaintiffs’ choice of remedy, allowing plaintiffs to proceed with claims that specifically invoked remedies outside of the IDEA’s reach. 111 Finally, several courts applied exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement. 112 However, these courts failed to recognize a viable

108. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 788 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[E]xhaustion is
required at a minimum when the claim explicitly seeks redress for a harm that IDEA procedures are designed to and are able to prevent—a harm with educational consequences that is
caused by a policy or action that might be addressed in an IEP.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 743
(2017); Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring exhaustion when “[b]oth the genesis and the manifestations of the problem [were] educational”).
109. Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 241, 248–49 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that parents’ section 504 and ADA claim for discrimination based on their child’s
school prohibiting the use of a service dog required IDEA exhaustion as relief was available
under the IDEA); Batchelor ex rel. R.B. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 273–74 (3d
Cir. 2014) (holding that the parent of student with disabilities was required to exhaust IDEA’s
administrative process before bringing retaliation claims against school district under section
504 and the ADA since alleged retaliation arose out of the mother’s advocacy with respect to
the student’s educational rights).
110. M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2006)
(holding that parents alleging discrimination under section 504 and the ADA when the school
nurse disclosed that their child had schizophrenia, resulting in harassment, did not have to
exhaust their claim under the IDEA); Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that “[n]on-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are
not subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably
have been redressed by the IDEA”), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2014).
111. See M.P., 439 F.3d at 867; Payne, 653 F.3d at 883.
112. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 548, 557–58 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that plaintiff may bypass IDEA’s exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement where
“(1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal question;
(3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; or (4) exhaustion would work severe or irreparable harm upon a litigant. Where plaintiffs allege ‘systemic legal deficiencies and, correspondingly, request system-wide relief that cannot be provided (or even addressed) through
the administrative process’ as described in the IDEA, they may be excused from exhaustion
requirement” (citation omitted) (quoting Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88–
89 (3d Cir. 1996))); see also MG ex rel. LG v. Caldwell–W. Caldwell Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp.
2d 305, 306 (D.N.J. 2011) (holding that the parents failed to satisfy the futility exception to the
exhaustion requirement); J.M. ex rel. Mata v. Tenn. Dep’t of Educ., 358 F. Supp. 3d 736, 752
(M.D. Tenn. 2018) (finding that the administrative procedures available under the IDEA
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path for section 504 and ADA claims that does not trigger the exhaustion
clause.
Some lower courts’ confusion seemingly centers on a misguided assumption that all claims about the adequacy of an educational program are
complaints about the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee. These courts fail to unpack
plaintiffs’ allegations to determine whether their claims were truly centered
on IDEA’s guarantee of FAPE or rather on disability rights laws’ promise of
equality and freedom from discrimination. Per the IDEA, only those claims
centered on IDEA’s FAPE guarantee require exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative remedies. 113
Courts directing plaintiffs to exhaust under the IDEA sometimes cite the
goals of administrative exhaustion, including judicial economy, deference to
agencies more familiar with educational policy, and the development of a
complete and accurate factual record. 114 While such policy considerations
may be compelling, they clearly do not eclipse the primacy afforded to the
plain-language expression of congressional intent. 115 The plain language of
the exhaustion clause unambiguously states that plaintiffs must only exhaust
IDEA’s remedies when “seeking relief that is also available under [the
IDEA].” 116 Thus, courts must do the work to investigate whether a plaintiff’s
claim is grounded in IDEA’s FAPE guarantee in order to correctly determine
whether IDEA’s exhaustion clause applies.
Largely because of the inconsistent application of IDEA’s exhaustion
clause across circuits, the Supreme Court, in 2017, stepped in with the goal

would be inadequate to address plaintiffs’ surviving claims); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs.,
668 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 2012); Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 52 n.12 (1st
Cir. 2000) (“[E]xhaustion of the administrative procedures . . . [w]ould not be required . . . in
cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter.” (quoting 121
CONG. REC. 37,416 (1975))).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
114. Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Insisting on [such
a requirement] forces parties to take administrative proceedings seriously, allows administrative agencies an opportunity to correct their own errors, and potentially avoids the need for
judicial involvement altogether.” (quoting P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Rev. Comm’n, 115 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1997))); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478,
489 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he exhaustion requirement is predicated on Congress’s belief, expressed through the statutory scheme, that administrative agencies can ‘get it right’: that the
agencies themselves are in the optimal position to identify and correct their errors and to finetune the design of their programs.”).
115. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
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of providing some needed clarity. 117 Unfortunately, by failing to recognize
the breadth of section 504 and ADA rights, the Court’s opinion only caused
further confusion, ultimately resulting in a continued restriction of rights.
C. The Supreme Court Examines Exhaustion
The Supreme Court considered the question of the IDEA’s exhaustion
clause in Fry v. Napoleon, settling on a litmus test of sorts. If the plaintiff invoked the right to FAPE, exhaustion of IDEA remedies was required. If not,
then a claim under the disability rights laws could proceed. 118 The Court
acknowledged the continued viability of certain section 504 and ADA
claims, stating, “A school could offer a FAPE to a child with a disability but
still run afoul of the laws’ ban on discrimination.” 119 Yet, the Court’s opinion
is flawed in two significant ways. First, the Court gave the disability rights
laws too cramped a reading, ascribing only certain types of discriminatory
conduct as within their reach. Second, the Court failed to give effect to the
plain language of the exhaustion clause, which defers to the plaintiff as the
master of their own claim. 120 By failing to acknowledge section 504 and the
ADA’s affirmative rights, the Court ultimately sowed more confusion than
clarity. The following Section distills the Fry opinion as a backdrop to the
later discussion of lower courts’ interpretations of Fry.
1.

Fry: What the Supreme Court Said

Fry involved a young girl, Ehlena Fry, with cerebral palsy who was eligible for protections under all three disability laws. 121 Ehlena was prescribed a
service dog to assist her with certain daily tasks, such as “ ‘retrieving dropped
items, helping her balance, . . . [and] opening and closing doors.’ ” 122 When
Ehlena began kindergarten, rather than allowing the service dog to accompany her to school, the school district proposed including a one-on-one human aide to support her throughout the school day. 123 Given that the aide
would perform the same tasks as the service dog, the school believed it was
satisfying FAPE. 124 However, Ehlena and her parents felt differently. 125 They
believed a service dog would afford Ehlena more independence than a human aide and that by denying her access to the dog, the school was discrimi117. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (“We granted certiorari to
address confusion in the courts of appeals as to the scope of [the IDEA’s] exhaustion requirement.”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 751.
120. Id. at 755.
121. See id. at 750–52.
122. Id. at 751.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 751–52.
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nating against her in violation of section 504 and the ADA. 126 Thus, the Frys
filed a lawsuit invoking these disability rights laws to seek declaratory relief
and money damages to compensate for Ehlena’s injuries, including emotional distress and pain, embarrassment, and mental anguish. 127
The central question before the Court was whether the Frys were required to first exhaust their disability rights claims under the IDEA. 128 The
Court, purporting to rely on plain language and congressional intent, reasoned that exhaustion applies only where a suit seeks relief for the denial of a
FAPE “because that is the only ‘relief’ the IDEA makes ‘available.’ ” 129 The
Court then developed a test, directing lower courts to examine the “gravamen” of the complaint to determine whether it seeks relief for the denial of
FAPE. 130 If the crux of the plaintiff’s claim involves FAPE, then IDEA exhaustion is required. 131
To help guide lower courts in their quest for the gravamen of a plaintiff’s
claim, the Court suggested two hypotheticals. First, could the plaintiff have
brought the same claim in a public place that was not a school? Second,
could an adult have brought essentially the same claim? 132 If the answer to
either question is no, the complaint likely centers on FAPE. 133 The two hypotheticals are meant to help lower courts distinguish complaints about the
IDEA’s provision of FAPE from complaints about disability-based discrimination. 134 The Court also suggested that lower courts could look to the history of the proceedings to determine whether a plaintiff had previously
engaged with the IDEA’s formal administrative procedures to resolve their
complaint. 135 A history of invoking IDEA due process procedures, in the
Court’s opinion, was indicative of a FAPE claim. 136
126. The Frys initially filed a complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that the school’s denial of the service dog was a violation of the
ADA and section 504. OCR found for the Frys, stating that denial of a service dog was discrimination in violation of section 504 and the ADA. It went on to state that “[a] school could offer
a FAPE to a child with a disability but still run afoul of the laws’ ban on discrimination.” OCR
compared the school district’s refusal to permit the service dog as similar to forcing a blind
student to be led around by others rather than use a cane. Id. at 751.
127. Id. at 751–52.
128. Id. at 752.
129. Id. at 752–53.
130. Id. at 752.
131. Id. at 753 (“The only relief that an IDEA officer can give—hence the thing a plaintiff
must seek in order to trigger [the exhaustion clause]—is relief for the denial of a FAPE.”).
132. Id. at 756.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 757. The Court explicitly cautions that this inquiry should be
limited to commencement of the IDEA’s formal administrative procedures; it does
not apply to more informal requests to IEP Team members or other school administrators for accommodations or changes to a special education program. After all,
parents of a child with a disability are likely to bring all grievances first to those
familiar officials, whether or not they involve the denial of a FAPE
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Perhaps more important than what the Court said in Fry is what it left
unsaid. The Court left significant gaps in its analysis, and these gaps have led
to a restriction of access to legitimate disability-rights-law claims.
2.

Fry: What the Supreme Court Left Unsaid

While the Supreme Court’s Fry opinion reaffirmed a plaintiff’s right to
assert disability-based protections independent of the IDEA, it failed to fully
explore the reach of the disability rights laws, leaving a fatal gap in its analysis. First, the Court failed to account for the scope of schools’ obligations toward students with disabilities by virtue of their status as students. Disability
rights laws impose certain obligations on schools with respect to their treatment of students with disabilities. Second, the Court, while acknowledging
the plain language of the exhaustion clause, failed to give effect to it; thereby
giving permission for lower courts to utterly ignore congressional intent. Finally, the Court failed to recognize the very real confusion plaintiffs face
when attempting to decipher which law presents their best hope for a remedy.
a.

Disability Rights Laws Contain a Distinct FAPE Right

To the extent the majority opinion discussed the disability rights laws, it
did so through the lens of what it termed “simple discrimination.” 137 Per Fry,
claims of “simple discrimination” do not need to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures because they do not involve a denial of IDEA’s FAPE. 138 But
schools owe more than just protections against discrimination for students
in schools. Schools have specific affirmative duties to students with disabilities that exist apart from general antidiscrimination obligations toward
adults with disabilities. Such affirmative duties include the mandate to provide these students with a FAPE as defined by section 504 regulations—the
right to whatever supports are necessary to meet their educational needs as
adequately as those of their peers. 139 A failure to provide these supports is
another form of discrimination cognizable under the disability rights laws.
The Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge the breadth of discrimination
that can occur with respect to students with disabilities left a gaping hole in
its exhaustion analysis.
Rather, the Fry Court’s two hypotheticals further encourage lower courts
to constrict disability-rights-law claims into only those involving “simple
discrimination”—defined as claims that could exist either outside of the

Id. at 757 n.11.
136. Id. at 757.
137. Id. at 756.
138. See id.
139. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)–(b) (2019).
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school setting or by an adult. 140 As a result, lower courts are erroneously
forcing children raising section 504 and ADA discrimination claims, independent of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation, to exhaust administrative procedures under the IDEA.
The issue can be clarified through a hypothetical. Victor, a child with diabetes, does not need special education and thus does not qualify for services
under the IDEA. But Victor meets eligibility requirements under section 504
and the ADA and requires supportive services to ensure equality of access to
the educational program. For instance, he may need a special meal and snack
schedule including unfettered access to snacks and water to ensure his ability
to remain attentive in class. Victor quite clearly would not need to exhaust
rights under the IDEA because he is not eligible as a “child with a disability”
under the IDEA. The IDEA’s FAPE guarantee does not even apply to him.
Yet, per the Supreme Court’s holding in Fry, if Victor were to file a complaint alleging the school district violated section 504 and the ADA by failing
to provide him supports necessary to equally access the educational program, the lower court may, using the Fry hypotheticals, erroneously capture
this as an IDEA claim and impose exhaustion.
Applying Fry’s guidance, a court would ask first whether Victor could
have brought this claim in a public, nonschool, environment. The answer, of
course, would be no, given that the claim centers on the special relationship
between a school and a student with a disability. Schools are obligated to
provide for students with disabilities in ways that other public entities simply
are not. No other public place would owe Victor access to snacks. A court
would next ask whether an adult in the school could have brought a similar
claim. Again, the answer would be no. An adult would have no need for accommodations providing access to the educational program. Children, by
virtue of their status as students, are conferred special rights in schools that
are not similarly applicable to adults. Thus, an adult is simply not an appropriate comparison to determine whether such rights are being invoked.
This hypothetical highlights the unique obligations that section 504 and
the ADA place on schools with respect to the children in their care. Schools
do not necessarily owe the same duties to adults, but the Court failed to explore this nuance in Fry. Put differently, Victor is invoking his section 504
FAPE right, which requires equality of access to the educational program. He
is not invoking the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee, as he does not qualify for
IDEA’s protections. Because the Fry Court did not distinguish between the
two, lower courts, applying the Supreme Court’s hypotheticals, may require
Victor to exhaust this claim under the IDEA. 141 Of course, such an action
would be futile as Victor does not have rights under the IDEA.

140. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.
141. Victor could only bring the claim against a school and could only do so as a student—an adult could not bring a similar claim. Thus, the Supreme Court’s Fry analysis would
suggest that IDEA exhaustion applies.
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Fry’s two hypotheticals may help to distinguish claims of what the Court
termed “simple discrimination” from claims about FAPE, but only where a
plaintiff is asserting a claim that is not inextricably linked to the educational
program. 142 Of course, students asserting claims arising out of school will often take issue with their educational program. When that happens, the Fry
hypotheticals curtail students’ rights when applied to disability-rights-law
claims seeking equal access to the educational program. Section 504 and the
ADA’s prohibition on disability-based discrimination mean that schools
must ensure that their educational programs are equally accessible to students with disabilities as they are to students without disabilities. 143 Students
with rights under these laws should be able to hold schools accountable
when they fail to furnish “reasonable modifications to [existing] practices.” 144 By failing to account for the disability laws’ FAPE obligation, mandating equality of access, the Supreme Court proscribed an ill-fitting solution
for determining whether exhaustion is required when plaintiffs seek to assert
this FAPE standard, and not an IDEA FAPE claim.
b. Plain Language Matters
A second oversight in Fry relates to the Court’s pallid treatment of plain
language. The plain language of the exhaustion clause states that exhaustion
is triggered when a plaintiff is “seeking relief that is also available under [the
IDEA].” 145 The inquiry centers on the plaintiffs’ choice of claims and, as the
Court acknowledged, does not impose the stricter standard of whether the
plaintiff “could have sought” relief available under the IDEA. 146 Importantly,
the Court recognized that the exhaustion clause anoints the plaintiff as the
master of their own claim. 147 The plaintiff decides what relief to seek. By this
logic, a plaintiff with rights under both the IDEA and disability rights laws
may elect to seek remedies under the disability rights laws and forgo those
available under the IDEA. Yet, the Court’s hypotheticals fail to give credence
to this choice. Because the hypotheticals only assist in carving out one category of disability rights claims—in the Court’s words, claims of “simple discrimination”—they capture equality-of-access claims as IDEA FAPE
claims. 148 Put differently, the Fry opinion fails to give effect to a plaintiff’s
choice to assert an equality-of-access claim under the disability rights laws.
While the Court acknowledged the plain-language meaning, it seemed
preoccupied with the danger of effectuating a “magic words” approach
whereby a plaintiff would only need to avoid mention of the IDEA in order

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.
See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)–(b).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132; see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299–301 (1985).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 755.
Id.
See id. at 756.
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to avoid exhaustion under that statute. 149 Thus, the Court instructed lower
courts to look beyond “artful pleading” to the “gravamen” of a complaint to
determine whether it seeks relief for the denial of FAPE. 150 Yet, if the exhaustion clause was meant both to give plaintiffs the power to choose which
claim to assert and to ensure the viability of section 504 and ADA claims, arguably the Court’s concern is misplaced.
Certainly, if the exhaustion clause is to have any meaning, courts must
scrutinize a complaint to determine whether a plaintiff is alleging a denial of
the IDEA’s FAPE, but two important signals in the plain language of the text
cut against the Fry Court’s preoccupation with “magic words.” 151 First, because the plaintiff is given authority to shape the claim, the analysis should
shift away from whether the plaintiff could have sought relief under the
IDEA to whether the plaintiff actually sought relief that is also available under the IDEA. To give effect to this language, courts need to consider the
plaintiff’s choice of framing, choice of remedy, and choice of words. Second,
if the plaintiff chooses to forgo IDEA’s FAPE remedy and pursue section 504
and the ADA’s equality-of-access right, courts must allow those claims to
proceed without exhaustion. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, the
IDEA does not demand equality of access, and thus there is no corresponding remedy for equality under the IDEA. 152
Ultimately, the plain language of the exhaustion clause calls for courts to
make two distinct inquiries. The first is a question of scope—what is encompassed within the IDEA’s FAPE obligation? A plaintiff is only required to
exhaust administrative procedures when they are seeking to assert IDEA
rights. This is the question tackled by the Supreme Court in Fry and the
question that the Court’s two hypotheticals fail to tease out. The second,
however, is a question of the plaintiff’s autonomy to seek relief under various
disability rights laws. Exhaustion is only required when a plaintiff is seeking
relief also available under the IDEA. It is not required when a plaintiff seeks
relief unavailable under the IDEA. While the Court acknowledged the second, it only attempted to give effect to the first. 153

149. Id. at 755 (“The inquiry, for example, does not ride on whether a complaint includes
(or, alternatively, omits) the precise words(?) ‘FAPE’ or ‘IEP.’ ”).
150. Id. at 755. In a footnote, the Court explicitly punted on the question whether exhaustion is required when a plaintiff complains about the denial of FAPE but seeks a remedy
such as money damages, which fall outside of the IDEA’s scope of relief. Id. at 752 n.4.
151. Id. at 755.
152. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189–90 (1982) (“Certainly the language of the
statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts—that States maximize the potential of handicapped children ‘commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children.’ ”).
153. See Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752 n.4 (“[W]e leave for another day a further question about
the meaning of § 1415(l): Is exhaustion required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a
FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is
not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award?”).

March 2021]

The Lost Promise of Disability Rights
c.

959

The Past Is Not Prologue

The Supreme Court left lower courts with one last befuddling instruction. It suggested that lower courts look to the procedural history for insights
into whether a plaintiff’s claim was rooted in the IDEA’s FAPE obligation,
stating that “prior pursuit of the IDEA’s administrative remedies will often
provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns the
denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term.” 154
For examples of jurists out of touch with the practical realities of ordinary
citizens, one need look no further.
To state that interplay between the disability rights laws and the IDEA is
complicated is a massive understatement. School officials charged with administering these laws are often unsure about their obligations under each. 155
Courts can get equally mired in the complexity, as evidenced by differences
across circuits when it comes to interpretations of the three laws. 156 Given
the lack of clarity involved when seeking to assert claims under any of the
laws, it seems unwise to place virtually any weight on a plaintiff’s prior decision to invoke the IDEA’s formal procedures, particularly when the vast majority of parents who initially invoke the IDEA’s due process procedures do
so without retaining counsel. 157 The Fry concurrence, accounting for both
the complexity in the law and the understandable gap in knowledge by pro
se parents, cautioned against relying on a history of the proceedings as a
signpost of a plaintiff’s intended claim. 158
To summarize, the Fry Court’s guidance is flawed for three distinct reasons. First, it refused to acknowledge the breadth of discrimination claims
cognizable under disability rights laws. By narrowly defining discrimination
claims under section 504 and the ADA as “simple discrimination,” the Court
154. Id. at 757. The Court cautioned that lower courts should only consider plaintiff’s
invocation of the IDEA’s formal administrative procedures and not informal requests made to
teachers or other school officials. Id. at 757 n.11.
155. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-348, SPECIAL EDUCATION: VARIED
STATE CRITERIA MAY CONTRIBUTE TO DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGES OF CHILDREN SERVED
15–16 (2019); see also Josh Cowin, Note, Is That Appropriate?: Clarifying the IDEA’s Free Appropriate Public Education Standard Post-Endrew F., 113 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 591 (2018) (arguing that lower courts and individuals remain confused about legal rights under the IDEA
following Endrew F.).
156. See Perry A. Zirkel, Annotation, Three Birds with One Stone: Does Meeting the Requirements of the IDEA for an IDEA-Eligible Student Also Comply with the Requirements of Section 504 and the ADA?, 300 EDUC. L. REP. 29, 34–35 (2014).
157. Perry A. Zirkel, Are the Outcomes of Hearing (and Review) Officer Decisions Different for Pro Se and Represented Parents?, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 263, 268 n.21
(2014); see also Lisa Lukasik, Special-Education Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of North Carolina’s First Tier, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 767 (2015) (documenting a 13.8 percent success rate
for complaints brought by petitioner parents without legal representation).
158. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“It is easy to imagine circumstances under which parents might start down the IDEA road and
then change course and file an action under the ADA or [Section 504] that seeks relief that the
IDEA cannot provide.”).
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completely ignored equality-of-access claims. And by failing to acknowledge
section 504 and the ADA’s independent equal-access right, the Supreme
Court gave lower courts permission to ignore the plaintiffs’ actual claim and
reframe virtually all education-related grievances as a question of the IDEA’s
obligation to confer FAPE. Second, the Court failed to give effect to congressional intent appointing the plaintiff as master of their own claim. Rather
than defend the plaintiff’s autonomy to choose their own relief, the Court
imposed a type of mandatory exhaustion regardless of the plaintiff’s choice
of remedy. Finally, the Court erroneously led lower courts astray when it advised them to use procedural history to help determine the claim centered on
the IDEA’s FAPE right. Parents may attempt to invoke IDEA remedies before realizing that the relief they seek is only available under disability rights
laws. These combined missteps have resulted in a restriction of access to disability rights laws’ remedies. The following Part traces and catalogues this
confusion.
III. A RESTRICTION OF RIGHTS: LOWER COURTS’ CONFUSION CONTINUES
Lower courts are clearly confused about how to apply Fry’s exhaustion
analysis. Several circuits seem to be applying the Court’s hypotheticals as a
two-part test for determining when exhaustion is needed. 159 Others do not
routinely apply the Court’s hypotheticals but still fail to recognize equalityof-access claims as viable under disability rights laws and independent of
IDEA rights or remedies. 160 When courts fail to recognize section 504 and
the ADA’s reach, or when they fail to appreciate the IDEA’s limits, students
with disabilities are prevented from accessing remedies that were meant to
address their unequal treatment.
Lower courts are misapplying Fry and restricting access to disability
rights remedies in three ways. First, courts are requiring exhaustion when
students are not eligible under the IDEA and thus not seeking or privy to
IDEA remedies. Second, courts force dually eligible students—students with
rights under both the IDEA and the disability rights laws—to exhaust under
the IDEA even when they seek remedies for disability discrimination available under only section 504 and the ADA. Finally, courts erroneously preclude disability-rights-law claims when a plaintiff is unable to prove a denial
of the IDEA’s FAPE. In such cases, courts mistakenly conclude that a finding
suggesting that a school has not denied FAPE applies to shield the school
equally from violations under section 504 and the ADA, not accounting for
the distinction in obligations under each law.

159.
160.

MacFarlane, supra note 18, at 551.
See id. at 549–50.
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A. IDEA-Ineligible Students Are Forced to Exhaust
The IDEA’s affirmative rights and remedies only apply to those students
who can meet the statute’s definition of a “child with a disability.” 161 As discussed above, eligibility under the IDEA is much more stringent than eligibility under the disability rights laws. 162 Because of the eligibility variances,
virtually all students who meet the IDEA’s narrower eligibility parameters
will also have rights under section 504 and the ADA. The reverse, however,
is not true. Students with eligibility under the disability rights laws do not
always meet the IDEA’s narrower definition of a “child with a disability.”
Thus, some students who seek remedies for disability-based discrimination
do not engage with the IDEA simply because they are not eligible for the
IDEA’s protections. Many courts fail to recognize this nuance and instead
assume that when a student brings a section 504 or ADA complaint about
the quality of their educational program, they are disguising an IDEA claim
to get around exhaustion. Rather than recognize the section 504 or ADA
claim as an independent assertion of rights that only exists under disability
rights laws, courts force these students to exhaust remedies under the
IDEA—a law that does not even apply to them.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has twice restricted access to disability-rights-law claims by forcing plaintiffs without IDEA eligibility to exhaust
administrative procedures under the IDEA. 163 In Wellman v. Butler Area
School District, a high school student with postconcussive syndrome alleged
that the school district failed to properly accommodate him under section
504 and the ADA. 164 The parents initially requested an evaluation for IDEA
services, but the school concluded that the student only met eligibility criteria under section 504 and ADA. 165 Despite several meetings to discuss accommodations under the disability rights laws, the plaintiff continued to feel
that the school was “uninterested” in providing “any sort of accommodations.” 166 This continued frustration with the school’s failure to meet the student’s needs caused the plaintiff to file suit against the school district

161. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).
162. See supra Section II.B.
163. Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2017); S.D. ex rel. A.D. v.
Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff also alleged violations
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wellman, 887 F.3d at 129.
164. 887 F.3d at 127–29. The student’s parent requested that the student not participate
in physical education classes, avoid unsuitable physical activity during football practice, and be
given extra study halls. In addition, the student’s doctor wrote a letter asking the school to provide academic accommodations including tutors and extended time to complete assignments.
Plaintiff alleges that school was dismissive of these requests, causing a worsening in symptoms.
Wellman, 887 F.3d at 127.
165. Id. at 128.
166. Id.
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claiming that the school’s inactions equated to disability discrimination
barred by the disability rights laws. 167
Rather than view this claim as a legitimate invocation of section 504
rights, the Third Circuit viewed this as an IDEA issue requiring exhaustion. 168 The court, applying Fry’s hypotheticals, concluded that because the
claims could only be brought by a student and would not have occurred outside the school setting, the claims centered on the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee. 169
Thus, the Court dismissed the claim. 170 In truth, the plaintiff did not assert
rights under the IDEA because the plaintiff was not eligible as a “child with a
disability” 171 under the IDEA. 172 Instead, the plaintiff attempted to assert his
right to equal access by claiming that the school’s failure to provide him with
necessary accommodations amounted to discrimination under the disability
rights laws. 173
Wellman is complicated by the fact that plaintiffs initially filed an administrative complaint under the IDEA and settled their claim. 174 Yet, its
precedent has restricted the ability of students with viable disability rights
claims to successfully have their day in court. For instance, in a subsequent
case before the Third Circuit, a student attempting to complain about the
quality of her accommodations was again prevented from filing this claim
and shut out of court. 175 In that case, the plaintiff, who suffered from chronic
sinusitis and intermittent asthma, received accommodations through a sec-

167. Id. at 128–29.
168. Wellman set a precedent in the Third Circuit to “review both the entire complaint
and each claim to determine if the plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.” Id. at 133. The
instruction acknowledged that a “plaintiff [may bring] a single complaint with different claims
arising from her school experience”—one requiring exhaustion, and the other not. Id.
169. Id. at 134. While the court correctly surmised that the plaintiff’s claims “all stem
from the alleged failure to accommodate his condition and fulfill his educational needs,” it
then erroneously determined that the claims were rooted in the IDEA’s provision of FAPE. Id.
170. Id. at 136.
171. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3).
172. Wellman, 877 F.3d at 128. Facts indicate that the plaintiff initially requested IDEA
eligibility, but after evaluation, the school concluded he was not eligible under the IDEA. The
plaintiff could have alleged that the school district failed to identify him as a child with a disability—a violation of IDEA’s “child find” obligation, but the plaintiff chose not to bring that
claim. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3), 1415(i)(2).
173. Wellman, 877 F.3d at 129.
174. Id. The plaintiff initially invoked due process remedies under the IDEA and settled
his claim by signing a general release appearing to waive all claims that could have been pursued under section 504 or the ADA. But the Third Circuit’s analysis did not take into consideration that release or the underlying due process procedures when determining that the claims
were purely rooted in the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee. Id. at 132–33.
175. S.D. ex rel. A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App’x 119, 123 (3d Cir.
2018) (“The District Court concluded that Appellants’ claims required compliance with the
IDEA’s administrative process and dismissed the claims without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.”), aff’g A.D. ex rel. S.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 90 F. Supp. 3d
326, 341–43 (D.N.J. 2015).
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tion 504 plan. 176 The plaintiff’s complaint centered around the quality of accommodations, including an alleged failure to provide specialized instruction that would enable the child to “enjoy the benefits of the educational
program to the same extent as his non-disabled peers.” 177 With this language, the plaintiff directly invoked section 504’s FAPE regulation, which
demands equality of access to the education program. 178 The plaintiff never
invoked the IDEA, nor did the plaintiff ever receive services under the
IDEA. 179 Yet, the appellate court, applying its precedent, concluded that both
the discrimination and retaliation claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. 180
The appellate court summarized the plaintiff’s complaint as “education
injuries,” stating that the “substance of [the plaintiffs’] grievance is that [the
school] failed to provide instruction tailored to meet [the child’s] special
needs resulting from his disability.” 181 The summary is accurate, but the conclusion that such injuries could only be characterized as a denial of the
IDEA’s right to FAPE is not. 182 In fact, the educational injuries were complaints about the quality and implementation of the student’s accommodations under section 504. By labeling these allegations as complaints about the
denial of the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee, the appellate court blocked the plaintiff’s access to relief under the disability rights laws, something that Congress
specifically wanted to avoid when it drafted the exhaustion clause. 183
The Third Circuit is not alone in its erroneous application of the IDEA’s
exhaustion clause to students who only seek section 504 and the ADA’s remedies. Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have prevented students with disability-rights-law claims from asserting them without first exhausting the
IDEA’s administrative procedures when the students did not have rights under the IDEA, nor were they seeking the IDEA’s remedies. 184 In the Sixth
Circuit, a child who was offered a 504 plan for a diagnosis of E. coli leading
to prolonged school absences attempted to complain about the school’s lack

176. Id. at 121.
177. Id. at 123 (quoting Amended Complaint at para. 41).
178. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
179. See S.D., 722 F. App’x at 121–23.
180. Id. at 126.
181. Id.
182. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (rejecting lower court’s
conclusion that all injuries that are educational in nature are rooted in the IDEA’s FAPE obligation).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 4 (1985).
184. See L.G. ex rel. G.G. v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. App’x 227, 231 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding
that a student diagnosed with E. coli infection alleging discrimination and retaliation pursuant
to section 504 and Title II had to first exhaust his claims under the IDEA); Nelson ex rel. C.N.
v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that a student with
polycystic ovarian syndrome and depression alleging discrimination under section 504 when
the school failed to allow her access to online schooling had to first exhaust this claim under
the IDEA).
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of accommodations and alleged retaliation for claiming disability discrimination. 185 The court there held exhaustion was required, summarizing the
injury as the school district’s failure to “provide him with the individuallytailored educational support he needed in order to continue his academic
studies.” 186 In the Eighth Circuit, a student with polycystic ovarian syndrome
and depression claimed that a school district’s denial of access to an online
educational program amounted to discrimination under section 504. 187 Just
like the Sixth and Third Circuits, the Eighth Circuit required exhaustion despite the plaintiff having never been identified for IDEA services, having
never sought out IDEA services, and having specifically sought to invoke
section 504’s prohibition on unequal or discriminatory treatment based on
disability. 188
Courts that force students who have never been found eligible under the
IDEA and who do not seek IDEA remedies to nonetheless exhaust IDEA’s
administrative procedures actively restrict access to important congressionally mandated rights. When Congress amended the IDEA to include an exhaustion clause, it “ ‘reaffirm[ed] the viability’ of federal statutes like the
ADA or Rehabilitation Act ‘as separate vehicles,’ no less integral than the
IDEA, ‘for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.’ ” 189 Congress’s
“carefully defined exhaustion requirement” only demands IDEA exhaustion
when IDEA relief is at issue. 190 Students who have never been identified as
eligible to receive services under the IDEA, and who are not attempting to
invoke IDEA rights, are not seeking IDEA relief. They are seeking to invoke
section 504’s “provision of regular or special education and related aids and
services” designed to meet their needs as equally as their peers without disabilities. 191 They seek disability rights laws’ promise of equal access. Per section 504’s regulations, this can and does include access to special education
and related aides and services to the extent such services are necessary to
prevent discrimination. 192

185. L.G., 775 F. App’x 227 at 228–29.
186. Id. at 231 (“L.G.’s invocation of his failing grades as evidence of the Board’s dereliction of duty is further revealing. Grades are, after all, academic markers used to signify a student’s intellectual progress along an education plan.”).
187. Nelson, 900 F.3d at 589–90.
188. Id.
189. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 750 (2017) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99296, at 4 (1985)).
190. Id.
191. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
192. Id.; see also Lyons ex rel. Alexander v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 420 (D.D.C. 1993)
(“As noted, the § 504 regulations include special education as one means of providing a free
appropriate public education. Therefore, in some situations, a school system may have to provide special education to a handicapped individual in order to meet the educational needs of a
handicapped student ‘as adequately as the needs’ of a nonhandicapped student, as required by
§ 104.33(b)(1).”).
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Arguably, students who have not yet been found eligible under the
IDEA may still have claims under the IDEA if they can prove that a school
violated a provision of the statute called “child find.” 193 Child find obligates
schools to affirmatively seek out children who they suspect may have a disability resulting in a need for special education and related services. 194 Thus,
students can claim a failure on the school’s part to timely identify them for
IDEA services. 195 However, the students mentioned in the above cases did
not allege an IDEA child-find violation. When courts require plaintiffs without rights under the IDEA to exhaust, courts are effectively forcing plaintiffs
to assert a child-find claim. Such action goes against congressional intent to
anoint the plaintiff as master of the claim. 196 Rather, it completely disregards
the plaintiff’s stated desire to invoke remedies under disability rights laws
and forces plaintiffs to seek IDEA remedies. Put differently, it forces plaintiffs to raise IDEA claims whenever they “could have” in complete disregard
for the plain language of the statute. 197
B. Dually Eligible Students Are Forced to Exhaust
Without question, children with disabilities can be eligible for protections under all three laws—the IDEA, section 504 and the ADA. In fact,
IDEA-eligible students are generally also covered by section 504 and the
ADA. 198 Like the plaintiff in Fry, these dually eligible students can elect to
invoke rights under any of these statutes but, of course, should only be required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies when their claim centers on the denial of the IDEA’s FAPE requirement. 199 Frustratingly, courts
often fail to make this distinction and force dually eligible students to exhaust their claims of disability discrimination under the IDEA.
Courts too often conflate all education-based claims with IDEA claims
because they fail to recognize the breadth of cognizable discrimination
claims under disability rights laws. These laws contain a right to be free from
disability-based discrimination, which includes the right to equal access to
193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).
194. Id.
195. D.K. ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We
have ‘infer[red] a requirement that [schools identify disabled children] within a reasonable
time after school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.’ ”
(quoting Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2012))).
196. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 755 (2017) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987)).
197. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the IDEA’s exhaustion clause asks whether the
complaint “seeks” relief available under the IDEA, as opposed to a stricter clause that asks
whether the plaintiff “could have sought” relief available under the IDEA. Id.
198. See Zirkel, supra note 157.
199. Even though these students technically have rights under three laws, this Article will
refer to them as “dually eligible” since the eligibility parameters of section 504 and the ADA are
the same. Thus, “dually eligible students” means to signify students with eligibility under the
IDEA and section 504/the ADA.
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the educational program. The IDEA’s exhaustion clause only applies when
the IDEA’s right to FAPE is at issue. This FAPE right, in turn, is only at issue
when a plaintiff’s claims are centered on progress toward individualized
goals. A complaint centered on disability-based discrimination can include
allegations of negative treatment due to disability, failure to provide equal
access to the educational program, or denial of benefits of the program.
While these complaints all touch on the educational program, they are not
invoking IDEA’s right to FAPE and thus should not be subjected to exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative remedies.
Disability rights laws also provide distinct remedies—namely, money
damages—that are not cognizable under the IDEA. Parents, understandably,
often seek money damages to deter and punish school officials for their failure to protect a child. 200 Money damages are unavailable under the IDEA. 201
Rather than recognize that claims invoking disability rights laws to seek
money damages are wholly outside the IDEA’s scope, as discussed below,
courts will look at the surrounding circumstances—namely, a child with an
IEP and an event being brought by a student in a school setting—and determine that exhaustion is required.
When plaintiffs request monetary relief, lower courts’ confusion arises
from the application of Fry’s two hypotheticals. 202 As the Fry concurrence
aptly predicted, the hypotheticals can be “misleading” because of the overlap
in relief available under the IDEA, section 504, and the ADA. 203 That is,
sometimes a student whose claim arises at school and is inextricably linked
to the educational program has potential remedies under both the IDEA and
the disability rights laws. However, given the plain language of the exhaustion clause, plaintiffs seeking remedies only available under the disability
rights laws should not be required to exhaust potential IDEA claims. Unfortunately, as the cases below highlight, lower courts continue to misapply the
exhaustion clause when dually eligible children attempt to invoke disability
rights laws’ remedies.
In J.L. v. Wyoming Valley West School District, a dually eligible student
with severe disabilities, including autism and language delays, alleged he
“suffered a deprivation of his protected educational rights” under both the
IDEA and section 504 due to improper use of restraints that resulted in
physical and emotional harm. 204 The defendant moved to dismiss the com200. See Weber, supra note 86, at 1102, 1107–10.
201. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing
Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 525 (4th Cir. 1998)) (money damages are not
available under the IDEA); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996); Crocker
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 1992).
202. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 756–57 (2017).
203. Id. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
204. J.L. ex rel. Leduc v. Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist., No. 3:15-1750, 2016 WL 4502451, at
*1–2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Plaintiffs allege that as a result of defendants’ misconduct, J.L.
has suffered a deprivation of his protected educational rights under the IDEA and § 504, a deprivation of his substantive due process rights under § 1983 ‘to be free from wrongful confine-
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plaint since the plaintiff failed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies. 205 The plaintiff countered by arguing that since their claim sought
money damages for physical injuries, exhaustion was not required. 206 The
district court sided with the school and dismissed the case for failure to exhaust under the IDEA. While the district court decided the case prior to the
Fry decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had the benefit of Fry when
it affirmed the ruling. 207
The facts in J.L. demonstrate the complexity involved in analyzing a
complaint implicating both the denial of the IDEA’s FAPE and discriminatory conduct under section 504 and the ADA. The plaintiff’s claims arose
from conduct that occurred on a van provided by the school district to
transport the child to and from school, per his IEP. 208 The plaintiff’s parents
first raised their concerns with the use of restraints in an IEP meeting. 209 The
questions whether a restraint was necessary, consented to, and properly implemented could correctly be categorized as issues arising from the provision
of FAPE under the IDEA. However, in addition to this FAPE analysis, there
exists a separate pure disability-based discrimination claim cognizable under
section 504 and the ADA. This claim is segregable from the IDEA’s FAPE
question and could not be remedied through the IDEA’s administrative process. 210 Whereas the IDEA is limited to equitable remedies, such as compensatory education, the disability rights laws’ remedies include money
damages. 211
Establishing a successful claim for money damages under disability
rights laws is, without doubt, a monumental task. 212 It requires a showing of
intent and, in some circuits, a showing of something that amounts to educational malpractice. 213 Nonetheless, it is a plaintiff’s right to invoke this remedy and marshal the evidence to support it. Trial courts should not be in the
business of passing judgment about the strength or weakness of a plaintiff’s
initial complaint but, rather, should only look to determine whether a plain-

ment, physical abuse/restraint, unjustified intrusions on personal liberty/security and arbitrary
governmental action,’ severe emotional distress and trauma, and educational and emotional
set-backs.”), aff’d, 722 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2018).
205. Id. at *4.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see J.L. ex rel. Leduc v. Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist., 722 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir.
2018).
208. J.L., 2016 WL 4502451, at *2.
209. Id.
210. The plaintiffs sought money damages, which are not available under the IDEA.
Thus, an IDEA administrative claim would not remedy the alleged harm.
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749–50,
754 n.8 (2017); see also Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 1 (2011).
212. Weber, supra note 86, at 1102–05.
213. Weber, supra note 16, at 1450–64.

968

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:933

tiff has sufficiently alleged facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 214
The Fry opinion acknowledged circumstances, like J.L.’s, with an “overlap in coverage” where “[t]he same conduct might violate all three statutes.” 215 Yet, as illustrated by J.L.’s conclusion, Fry’s suggested framework
failed to help tease out disability rights claims from IDEA claims. 216 When
applying the Fry hypotheticals, the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that
“[t]he use of restraints ‘would not have occurred outside the school setting
and . . . a nonstudent could not (and would not) have “pressed essentially the
same grievance.” ’ ” 217 Thus, they dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust under the IDEA despite the “overlap” discussed in Fry and in complete
disregard of the plaintiff’s stated claim for money damages—a remedy unavailable under the IDEA. 218
A similar ruling came out of the Eighth Circuit, where the plaintiff
claimed unlawful use of isolation and physical restraints in violation of the
disability rights laws. 219 Just as in J.L., the child at issue had an IEP and thus
was dually eligible under both the IDEA and the disability rights laws. 220
Again, the central issue was the school’s use of restraints, with the plaintiff
alleging that the child was “placed in physical restraints for half of the time
he actually spent at [school]” and consequently was “denied[,] . . . because of
his disability, participation in and the benefits of a public education.” 221
There, the court acknowledged section 504 and the ADA’s prohibition on
disability discrimination but failed to see how the use of prolonged isolation
and restraints could be cognizable as a disability-discrimination claim. The
Eighth Circuit faulted the complaint for failing to use the word “discrimination” and surmised that because the claim tied the alleged misuse of isolation
and physical restraints to a failure to provide “sufficient ‘supportive services’

214. M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2008) (“To
state a prima facie case under section 504, a plaintiff must show that he or she (1) is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) was denied the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity receiving federal funds; and (3) was discriminated against based on her disability. . . . Additionally, a plaintiff must show that the discrimination reflected bad faith or gross
misjudgment.” (citations omitted)).
215. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.
216. See id.
217. J.L. ex rel. Leduc v. Wyo. Valley W. Sch. Dist., 722 F. App’x 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2017)).
218. Id. at 194.
219. J.M. ex rel. McCauley v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 2017).
The plaintiff also claimed violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state civil rights laws.
220. Id. at 946–47.
221. Id. at 948–49 (third alteration in original) (quoting Second Amended Complaint at
2, 8, J.M. ex rel. McCauley v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 4:15-CV00866, 2016 WL 795804 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 1, 2016)).
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to permit [the child] to benefit from . . . instruction,” it was related to FAPE
and required exhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative remedies. 222
Such a conclusion obscures the “overlap” in rights acknowledged in Fry
and fails to disentangle the IDEA FAPE claim from the discrimination
claim. 223 As acknowledged in Fry, “[a] school’s conduct[,] . . . say, some refusal to make an accommodation[, ]might injure [a child] in ways unrelated
to a FAPE.” 224 Thus, when the injury or harm is not intertwined with “measuring the adequacy of education that a school offers to a child with a disability,” the IDEA’s FAPE right is not at issue. 225 The IDEA’s FAPE is rooted in
questions about whether a school reasonably calculated an IEP that “enable[d] a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 226 Complaints about physical and emotional harm stemming from
the alleged improper use of physical restraints and isolation are not complaints about the adequacy of the educational program. They are, in fact,
complaints about discrimination suffered because of disability. Yet, because
they happen at school and to children, courts fail to extricate them from the
IDEA’s FAPE.
The Fry Court acknowledged that a complaint arising out of a school’s
treatment of a child with a disability, and thus related to their education,
may not always be a complaint about FAPE. 227 Yet, its two hypotheticals—at
least as applied by lower courts—do not appear to help distinguish FAPE
claims from disability rights claims when the underlying facts could support
either. Possibly, lower courts are misapplying the hypotheticals. In Fry, the
Court acknowledged that a hypothetical claim arising out of a scenario of a
teacher striking a student “out of animus or frustration” would likely not require exhaustion. 228 The Court opined, “A telling indicator of that conclusion is that a child could file the same kind of suit against an official at ananother public facility for inflicting such physical abuse—as could an adult
subject to similar treatment by a school official.” 229 Arguably, the same is
true in the restraint-and-isolation fact pattern. A child could file a similar
suit against an official at another public facility. The key difference is that
schools, unlike many other public facilities, have special duties to children
with disabilities rooted in disability rights statutes. Put differently, employees
at a public facility would never have reason to restrain a child. The reality
that such actions could have occurred at only school—at the behest of school
employees—is not always determinative that the plaintiff intends to invoke

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
(2017).
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 949 (quoting Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748–49 (2017)).
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 754–55 (2017).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 753–54.
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 754.
Id. at 756 n.9.
Id. at 757 n.9.

970

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:933

IDEA’s rights or remedies. And, at least when the plaintiff alleges money
damages, the remedy is not one that the IDEA can provide.
To give effect to congressional intent as set forth in the plain language of
the exhaustion clause, courts must give more weight to the plaintiff’s stated
choice of remedy. Doing so would ensure that in situations where the same
set of facts could establish a claim under either the IDEA or the disability
rights laws, it is plaintiffs who choose, and not courts that demand, which
remedy to seek.
C. Courts Misconstrue Preclusion
The final way in which courts restrict student access to disability rights
laws is through erroneous application of claim and issue preclusion. Claim
preclusion, or res judicata, is the legal principle that a cause of action cannot
be relitigated once it has been decided on the merits. 230 Claim preclusion will
act as a bar to a subsequent action when the parties have previously litigated
the same claim to a valid final judgement. 231 The central issue is generally
whether the second action is identical to one that the parties previously litigated. 232 Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, prohibits relitigation of factual or legal issues that have been decided in earlier litigation. 233
In short, “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered.” 234 The following Section will highlight the danger in applying both
principles to preclude claims under the disability rights laws.
Claim and issue preclusion block plaintiffs’ ability to invoke disability
rights law remedies in two distinct ways. First, courts find that when the
same set of facts underlies both the disability rights and IDEA claims, once
the IDEA claim is adjudicated, the disability rights claim is redundant. Put
differently, a finding that a school provided FAPE under the IDEA acts to
insulate schools from allegations of disability-based discrimination. Second,

230. John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims for
Purposes of Claim Preclusion by Res Judicata Under Federal Law, 82 A.L.R. FED. 829 Art. 2(a)
(1987) (“ ‘Res judicata,’ or ‘res adjudicata’ in the parlance of some of the earlier decisions, is a
Latin phrase which in translation within a legal context can be rendered ‘a matter adjudged’ or
‘a thing adjudicated.’ As a judicial doctrine in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
rule of res judicata holds that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon
a matter is conclusive between the same parties as to that matter when drawn in question in
another court.”).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. The Restatement describes the general rule as follows: “When an issue of fact or law
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 (AM. L. INST. 1980); see also id. § 28 (listing exceptions such as whether appellate review
was available or whether there were “differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed”).
234. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991).
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courts find that plaintiffs are unable to state a claim for damages under disability rights laws after a finding that a school met its obligation to confer
FAPE under the IDEA. Both approaches result in outright dismissal of disability-rights-law claims based purely on rulings premised on IDEA obligations.
1.

Conflating FAPE with Disability Discrimination

When courts apply principles of res judicata to block disability rights
claims, they engage in a false equivalency. To establish a prima facie case under section 504 or the ADA, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate
disability-based discrimination. 235 Some circuits have held that “complying
with the IDEA is sufficient to disprove educational discrimination.” 236 Thus,
in these circuits, plaintiffs that lose IDEA claims are barred from even establishing a disability-rights-law claim. 237 As one court held, “When [the IDEA]
process produces an administrative decision that is upheld on judicial review
under IDEA, principles of issue and claim preclusion may properly be applied to short-circuit redundant claims under other laws.” 238 The critical
misstep in the analysis centers on the word “redundant.” The IDEA’s right to
FAPE is simply not the same as disability rights laws’ promise of equal access. Because courts erroneously conflate IDEA rights and remedies with
those available under the disability rights laws, they apply issue and claim
preclusion to restrict access to section 504 and ADA remedies even though
the obligations under each law are distinct. 239

235. Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 565 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that
plaintiffs must also allege facts to demonstrate that they are (1) an individual with a disability
under the Act (2) “otherwise qualified” to participate in the program, and for section 504 only,
that (3) “the program receives federal financial assistance”).
236. Id.; see also Boutelle v. Bd. of Educ., No. 17-1232, 2019 WL 3081113, at *3–5
(D.N.M. July 15, 2019) (holding that the plaintiff was unable to establish a section 504 discrimination claim because an administrative court had held that the school district did not deny
FAPE and specifically found that the child was disciplined not because of disability but rather
because of misconduct not related to disability); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 696, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1108–09 (D. Minn. 1998) (“Notwithstanding a plaintiff’s ability to proceed simultaneously with IDEA and other statutory claims, he cannot establish a viable claim under the nonIDEA causes of action, where the predicate acts, upon which he has premised those claims,
have withstood judicial review under the IDEA.” (citing Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. ex rel.
J.D., 88 F.3d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 1996))); M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d
865, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that student’s section 504 and ADA claims of “unlawful discrimination” are not precluded if they are “wholly unrelated to the IEP process”).
237. E.g., Miller, 565 F.3d at 1246; Boutelle, 2019 WL 3081113, at *3; Moubry, 9 F. Supp.
2d at 1108–09; see also M.P., 439 F.3d at 868.
238. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 88 F.3d at 562.
239. E.g., I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Schs., 863 F.3d 966, 972 (8th
Cir. 2017) (precluding plaintiff’s ADA and section 504 equality-of-access claims because they
“all grew out of or were intertwined with allegations that the District failed to properly implement his IEP, allegations that were necessarily resolved in rejecting his IDEA claims”).
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Courts that find the “provision of FAPE [to be a] per se provision of education free from disability discrimination” are simply wrong. 240 In fact, the
Fry case is a direct repudiation of the belief that IDEA judgments should, in
all cases, act as a bar to disability-based discrimination claims. 241 The Fry
Court recognized that a school could meet its obligations under the IDEA
while still engaging in unlawful discrimination per the disability rights
laws. 242 This is precisely because obligations imposed on schools by each law
are not entirely coextensive. The IDEA’s FAPE requirement is rooted in an
individual child’s right to receive the special education and supports he or
she requires to ensure appropriate progress toward individual goals. 243 The
law is inward looking, concerned about whether the child’s individual progress is “appropriately ambitious in light of [their] circumstances.” 244 Section
504 and the ADA are outward looking because they require schools to consider questions of equality of access as compared to nondisabled peers. 245
Thus, as in Fry, when questions of equal access arise, whether a school met
its obligations to ensure individual progress under the IDEA is not relevant
to the analysis.
One reason many courts feel comfortable with an outright dismissal of
disability rights claims after a plaintiff has lost an IDEA challenge has to do
with the language of section 504’s FAPE regulation. The regulation states
that one way to meet section 504’s FAPE standard is by developing and implementing a valid IEP. 246 However, the regulation cannot be read as stating
an equivalency in all cases between the IDEA and section 504. To read it that
way would be to deny the clearly distinct FAPE standards written into each
law. 247 Rather, the only way to make sense of the regulation within the context of the statutes’ distinct FAPE obligations is to read it as establishing one

240. Miller, 565 F.3d at 1246 (citation omitted).
241. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 754–55 (2017).
242. Id. at 754 (“A school’s conduct toward such a child—say, some refusal to make an
accommodation—might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE, which are addressed in statutes other than the IDEA.”).
243. 20 U.S.C. § 1412; Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.
Ct. 988, 993–94 (2017).
244. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
245. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2019); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (2019).
246. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2); see also Reed v. Kerens Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV1228-BH, 2017 WL 2463275, at *13 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2017) (“At a minimum, then, a plaintiff
is required to allege a denial of a FAPE under IDEA to sustain a § 504 claim based on the denial of a § 504 FAPE because ‘§ 504 regulations distinctly state that adopting a valid IEP is sufficient but not necessary to satisfy the § 504 FAPE requirements.’ ” (citing Estate of Lance v.
Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 992 (5th Cir. 2014))).
247. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (“FAPE under the IDEA and
FAPE as defined in the § 504 regulations are similar but not identical.”).
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path, but not the exclusive path, to meeting section 504’s FAPE requirement. 248
Section 504’s FAPE regulation details only one of several ways in which
the statute’s broader prohibition against discrimination must be met. 249 The
text of the statute prohibits not just discrimination but also exclusion from
participation in and the denial of benefits of public programs. 250 Schools
must also abide by several other regulations including prohibiting the separation of students with disabilities from their peers without justifiable reasons, ensuring validated and unbiased evaluations, and providing equal
access to nonacademic and extracurricular activities. 251 Moreover, both
courts and federal agencies enforcing these laws have acknowledged separate
obligations under all three laws. 252 Compliance under one does not necessarily equate to compliance under all three. Thus, a plaintiff’s disabilityrights-law claim can involve issues of equality that go beyond what is obligated by the IDEA.
Several courts have recognized the differences in rights and remedies allowed under the IDEA as opposed to disability rights laws. But, even there,
courts’ application of issue preclusion needlessly restricts section 504 and
ADA claims. 253 For instance, in a case appealed to the First Circuit, parents
of a nonverbal child with multiple disabilities, including autism and cognitive impairments, wanted their child to wear an audio-recording device to

248. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (2019) (“Implementation of an Individualized Education
Program developed in accordance with the [IDEA] is one means of meeting [the substantive
portion of the § 504 of FAPE regulation.]” (emphasis added)).
249. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32–104.37.
250. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
251. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (requiring schools to identify and locate individuals with disabilities); § 104.34 (requiring that students with disabilities be educated with their nondisabled
peers to the maximum extent appropriate); § 104.35 (requiring unbiased and validated evaluations to determine appropriate placement); § 104.36 (requiring that schools implement procedural safeguards that include notice, access to records, and impartial hearings); § 104.37
(requiring equal access to nonacademic services and extracurricular activities).
252. See, e.g., K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1098–99,
1101 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Given these differences between the two statutes, we are unable to articulate any unified theory for how they will interact in particular cases. Precisely because we are
unable to do so, we must reject the argument that the success or failure of a student’s IDEA
claim dictates, as a matter of law, the success or failure of her Title II claim.”). The Departments of Justice and Education issued joint guidance attempting to clarify schools’ obligations
to students with communication needs under all three laws. CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
& OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION FOR STUDENTS WITH
HEARING, VISION, OR SPEECH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
(2014), https://www.ada.gov/doe_doj_eff_comm/doe_doj_eff_comm_faqs.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Y4WZ-AZZN] [hereinafter FAQs] (indicating that in order to comply with the ADA,
schools may need to provide auxiliary aides and services not required under the IDEA).
253. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 290 (5th Cir. 2005). Issue preclusion is
appropriate when “(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; and (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision.” Id.
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school. 254 The parents argued the recording would help them better understand their child’s school day as he was unable to communicate for himself. 255 The parents initially filed an IDEA administrative complaint and
subsequently filed an ADA complaint. 256 The First Circuit found that the
hearing officer’s holding, indicating that the recording device was not necessary for the provision of the IDEA’s FAPE, prevented the plaintiffs from establishing their ADA claim. 257 Quite simply, the court’s analysis is akin to
comparing apples to oranges. A finding premised on the school’s ability to
offer an educational program that is reasonably calculated to ensure an individual child’s progress may have little bearing on whether this program also
affords equal access to the educational program. 258
The plaintiffs in that case were attempting to invoke the ADA’s effective-communication regulation, which requires schools to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with
disabilities[, including companions,] an equal opportunity to participate in,
and enjoy the benefits of [a public program].” 259 The plaintiffs argued that
because their son was unable to communicate with them about his school
day, the ADA’s effective-communication regulation required that the school
district allow him to wear a recording device to ensure his equal access to the
educational program. 260
The question whether the ADA’s effective-communication regulation
would require implementation of a recording device is not easily decided. 261
It is at least arguable that the parents, as companions, were not denied equal
access because they were able to adequately communicate with teachers
about their child’s experiences. What is crystal clear, however, is that the
IDEA’s FAPE obligation is utterly irrelevant to that analysis. The ADA’s regulation imposes an equal-opportunity-to-benefit standard while the IDEA
only asks what services are necessary to ensure appropriate progress. Thus,
whether a school met its obligation to students under the IDEA is not relevant to an inquiry about whether a particular communication aide is necessary to provide a child, or their companions, equal access to the educational
program.
254. Pollack ex rel. B.P. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 886 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2018).
255. See id.
256. Id. at 80.
257. Id. at 91.
258. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2019); FAQs, supra note 252.
259. Pollack, 886 F.3d at 81 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2018)); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.160(a)(2) (“For purposes of this section, ‘companion’ means a family member, friend, or
associate of an individual seeking access to a service, program, or activity of a public entity,
who, along with such individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public entity should
communicate.”); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1102
(9th Cir. 2013).
260. Pollack, 886 F.3d at 80.
261. In Pollack, the school district raised compelling arguments about the recording device’s potential for disruption and interference with the learning process. Id. at 83.
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The First Circuit recognized the different obligations under the IDEA
and the disability rights laws but still proceeded to apply res judicata principles to dismiss the ADA claim. 262 Their analysis highlights another frequent
misstep courts make when analyzing ADA claims. The court applied regulations intended for the employment context to an education case. 263 Citing an
employment law case, the First Circuit determined that plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the accommodation provided increased access to
a public service. 264 Because the administrative ruling found that a recording
would provide no educational benefit and thus was unnecessary for FAPE,
the First Circuit found that the plaintiffs were unable to meet the ADA’s increased-benefit standard. 265
The court’s increased-benefits analysis is flawed in two distinct ways.
First, the ADA’s different subchapters govern vastly different settings. 266 Title I, applying to employment, sets forth different standards for accommodations than Title II, which, of course, applies to schools. 267 For a myriad of
reasons, duties that employers owe to employees with disabilities differ from
duties that schools owe to students with disabilities. Second, even if plaintiffs
had to demonstrate an increased benefit, the IDEA’s benefit analysis should
still not act as a complete bar to the ADA claim. Benefit in this context is defined in relationship to IEP goals. Put differently, the central question is
whether the audio recording increases the student’s ability to make progress
toward IEP goals. The ADA, however, defines benefit in the context of equal
access for the student and his parents. It asks whether the recording is necessary to afford the student or his parents “an equal opportunity to participate
in, and enjoy the benefits of,” public education. 268 Thus, the IDEA’s finding
regarding individual progress has no bearing on whether the audio recording provides equal access to the educational program.
This is not to say that issue preclusion could never be appropriately applied to dismiss disability rights claim. However, the analysis should turn on
whether the legal standards, and not just the facts, are identical. For example,
the Fifth Circuit correctly traversed the nuance between the IDEA and disability rights laws when it precluded inaccessibility claims that were already
rejected under the IDEA. 269 The case involved a high school student who

262. Id. at 79–81.
263. Lingren, supra note 17, at 642; Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d. 136 (1st Cir.
2014).
264. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001).
265. Pollack, 886 F.3d at 83–86.
266. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (employment); §§ 12131–12165 (public services);
§§ 12181–12189 (public accommodations and services operated by private entities); §§ 12201–
12213 (miscellaneous provisions).
267. Compare id. §§ 12111–12117, with id. §§ 12131–12165.
268. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2019); see also FAQs, supra note 252, at 13–14 (questions 8
and 9).
269. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 297 (5th Cir. 2005).
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used a wheelchair and brought suit under both the IDEA and disability
rights laws, alleging that parts of the high school campus were inaccessible to
him. 270 The Court noted the difference between the goals of the IDEA and
those of section 504 and the ADA, but it also traced the root of the legal
standard at issue—accessibility—to the same federal guidelines. Because accessibility standards are identical under all laws, what is owed to a student
under the IDEA is equivalent to what is owed under the disability rights
laws. Thus, when a final judgment has been rendered on an accessibility issue under the IDEA, it is redundant and therefore precluded from being relitigated under disability rights laws.
2.

Requiring Intent to Recover Damages

The final way issue and claim preclusion act to restrict legitimate disability rights claims has to do with the intent standard that many courts impose
on plaintiffs seeking monetary damages under the disability rights laws. 271
Although scholars have compellingly called into question whether an intent
standard is warranted under disability rights laws, most circuits impose one,
at least in cases where plaintiffs seek money damages. 272 Courts requiring intent generally agree that the standard may be met by a showing of “deliberate
indifference,” but in some circuits a heightened showing of “bad faith [or]
gross misjudgment” is required. 273 As one court explained, “So long as [the]
state officials involved have exercised professional judgment, in such a way
as not to depart grossly from accepted standards among educational professionals, we cannot believe that Congress intended to create liability under
§ 504.” 274 In short, compliance with the IDEA’s FAPE guarantee insulates
schools against allegations of professional misjudgment. 275
270. Id. at 275.
271. Weber, supra note 16, at 1417.
272. Compare Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, a public
entity can be liable for damages under § 504 if it intentionally or with deliberate indifference
fails to provide meaningful access or reasonable accommodation to disabled persons.”), with
D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[F]acts
creating an inference of professional bad faith or gross misjudgment are necessary to substantiate a cause of action for intentional discrimination under § 504 or ADA against a school district . . . .”).
273. See Perry A. Zirkel, Do Courts Require a Heightened, Intent Standard for Students’
Section 504 and ADA Claims Against School Districts?, 47 J.L. & EDUC. 109, 114 (2018).
274. Latasha, 629 F.3d at 454–55 (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171
(8th Cir. 1982)); see also Washington ex rel. J.W. v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 403 F. Supp. 3d 610,
622 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (“[Section] 504 do[es] not create ‘general tort liability for educational
malpractice.’ ”); Hoekstra ex rel. Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 283, 103 F.3d 624, 627 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that where the claim is brought in the context of educational services of
disabled children, ADA liability does not attach absent a showing of gross misjudgment, or bad
faith, on the part of the school officials).
275. Interestingly, courts have held that “[t]he mere fact that complying with the IDEA is
sufficient to disprove educational discrimination does not mean that every violation of the
IDEA necessarily proves a discrimination claim.” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 565 F.3d
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There are compelling reasons for courts to hold that intent is not required under section 504 and the ADA. 276 However, assuming that intent is
required, the fact that a school complied with the IDEA is not conclusive
proof that it did not also act with gross misjudgment. For instance, a school
may have thoroughly complied with a child’s IEP and simultaneously employed a teacher who physically struck a child. A plaintiff may wish to invoke disability rights laws to allege discrimination and seek compensatory
damages. Certainly, a school’s correct implementation of the IDEA would
have no bearing on whether physically hitting a child amounts to “bad faith
or gross misjudgment.” 277
Rather than exclude viable disability-discrimination claims, courts
should allow plaintiffs to marshal the evidence required to state a claim for
money damages, even where a showing of intent is required. Because obligations under all three laws are not coextensive, compliance with one does not
equate to compliance with all. Put differently, an individual’s right to an educational program reasonably calculated to ensure progress toward appropriate goals cannot be fashioned into their right to be free from physical
abuse or mistreatment on the basis of their disability. To give effect to congressional intent in enacting disability rights laws, courts must ensure plaintiffs are not unduly proscribed from invoking their rights under these laws.
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the exhaustion clause,
lower courts remain confused in its application. Their confusion leads to
needless restriction of access to important disability law rights and remedies.
Courts force exhaustion when students have no rights under the IDEA,
when they are not attempting to invoke the IDEA’s remedies, and when the
IDEA is unable to redress their alleged harms. Courts must take a more nuanced approach when applying the exhaustion clause to ensure appropriate
access to disability rights laws. The following Part outlines a path that would
assist courts in that effort.

1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009). This is in part because many circuits hold that in order to establish
discrimination under the disability rights laws a plaintiff must prove an element of causation—
that the discrimination was “by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Id. (quoting Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999)).
276. Weber, supra note 16, at 1450–52 (noting absence of intent or animus requirement
for ADA Title II and section 504 claims and tracing courts’ imposition of the intent standard
for such claims back to misguided application of judicial language from Title VI and Title IX of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Claire Raj, The Misidentification of Children with Disabilities: A Harm with No Foul, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 373, 419 (2016) (arguing that courts mistakenly
incorporate Title VI’s intent requirement into ADA Title II and section 504 misidentification
claims because they fail to adhere to Supreme Court precedent acknowledging differences between race discrimination and discrimination against persons with disabilities (the former often rooted in animus and the latter in benign neglect)).
277. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982).
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IV. A RESURRECTION OF RIGHTS: DISAGGREGATING CLAIMS
Congress did not enact the exhaustion clause to curtail rights under other disability rights statutes. Nor did Congress enact the exhaustion clause to
ordain the IDEA as an exclusive path to remedy disability-based harms. To
the contrary, its central objective was to ensure students with disabilities still
had access to important statutes meant to facilitate equality and prohibit disability discrimination. 278 In Fry, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
clarify how the IDEA and the disability rights laws interact, but instead the
Court’s guidance has had the opposite effect. 279 The Court’s failure to recognize the full scope of rights and remedies under section 504 and the ADA
has resulted in plaintiffs’ inability to access these rights. Given both the recency and finality of the Supreme Court decision, it is now incumbent upon
Congress or the U.S. Department of Education to take steps to clarify the
path forward. Short of that, lower courts must analyze section 504 and the
ADA claims with much more nuance if they are to avoid unnecessarily restricting rights.
As the likelihood of congressional or executive action falls somewhere
between seriously unlikely and utterly inconceivable, it is up to courts to
ameliorate the problem. This Article proposes a straightforward framework
that will give courts the tools to do just that. It disaggregates cases into two
major categories and then three subparts. The major categories are obvious:
(1) cases involving students only eligible under section 504 and ADA and (2)
cases involving dually eligible students with rights under disability rights
laws as well as the IDEA. Cases under the first category never require plaintiffs to exhaust the IDEA before proceeding. The second major category requires special attention to the type of disability barrier a student is facing and
the remedy the student is seeking. Students bringing cases under these subparts must also be permitted to proceed without exhausting IDEA remedies.
A. Students with Eligibility Under Section 504 and the ADA
The first step is to recognize that the IDEA does not cover all students
who have disabilities. Courts must be aware of the IDEA’s relatively narrow
eligibility categories as compared to disability rights laws. 280 The result is that
many students with disabilities only have access to one set of remedies—
those under disability rights laws. Second, while the IDEA and the disability
rights statutes both guarantee FAPE, courts must recognize that the concept
has different meanings under each law. 281 While there is certainly overlap
between students and remedies under the statutes, there are also distinct categories of students and remedies that do not overlap. Where these students

278.
279.
280.
281.

H.R. REP. NO. 99-296, at 4 (1985).
See supra Parts II, III.
See supra Sections I.A–B.
See supra Section I.C.
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and remedies do not overlap, it is entirely inappropriate to require students
with claims under the disability rights laws to exhaust theoretical claims under the IDEA prior to filing a complaint in federal court.
To avoid this problem, courts must recognize the full breadth of disability rights laws, and in particular their distinct FAPE right. Section 504 and
the ADA, by incorporation, define FAPE as the right to an educational program “designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons.” 282 This means
that when students have complaints about the availability or quality of educational services or related supports, they are invoking the right to equal access as set forth in disability rights laws. Forcing a student who is not IDEA
eligible to exhaust their claim both is futile and unjustly delays their attempt
at a remedy.
Courts can identify plaintiffs who are eligible under section 504 and the
ADA but not the IDEA quite easily. As a starting point, courts should assume complaints that do not specifically invoke the IDEA are invoking disability rights laws. Of course, courts should then scrutinize the complaint for
any indication otherwise, such as the existence of an IEP. Courts’ focus
should be on the plain language of the complaint. Students who only have
rights under section 504 and the ADA will not invoke the IDEA in a complaint. Further, such students will not have an IEP and will not focus their
remedies on changes or improvements to an IEP, again because they are ineligible for IEPs altogether. These students could challenge IDEA eligibility
and thereby seek an IDEA remedy, but short of that action any child without
an IEP and who is not affirmatively making an IDEA claim should not be
assumed to be IDEA eligible by a court. Nor should such a student be forced
to exhaust a complaint about IDEA rights that they are not choosing to invoke. 283 Rather, courts must view their complaints—even when centering on
the quality of their educational program—to be complaints rooted in section
504 and the ADA.
In some instances, such children may have some past history of invoking IDEA’s due process remedies, but this alone does not indicate that their
current action is centered on IDEA’s right to FAPE. 284 Parents are often confused about their rights under these statutes and may have been previously
and incorrectly directed to the IDEA as their only recourse for complaints

282. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (2019).
283. Such a child could theoretically have rights under the IDEA if the school should
have reasonably suspected they were a child with a disability and evaluated them as such. The
IDEA places an affirmative obligation on schools to seek out children suspected of having disabilities who are in need of special education services. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see also D.K.
ex rel. Stephen K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We have ‘infer[red]
a requirement that [schools identify disabled children] within a reasonable time after school
officials are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.’ ” (alterations in original)
(quoting Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2012))).
284. See Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2017).
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about the educational program. 285 Because of the lack of clarity surrounding
the interactions between all three laws, a parent’s past mistaken invocation
of the IDEA in a prior administrative proceeding should not act as a bar to
the current claim.
Students with rights only under disability rights laws have simpler cases
to disaggregate. The facts should clearly indicate that a child, without IDEA
rights, is clearly not filing a complaint about the IDEA’s provision of FAPE.
Courts simply must acknowledge a separate, but no less important, right to
equal access of the educational program under section 504 and the ADA. 286
The more complicated cases are those involving children who are dually eligible for IDEA as well as disability rights law protections. However, as
demonstrated in the following Section, by disaggregating those claims into
identifiable categories, courts can more readily ensure the continued viability
of section 504 and ADA claims.
B. Students with Eligibility Under All Laws
Students with eligibility under the disability rights laws as well as the
IDEA present the most difficult exhaustion questions. With these students,
courts cannot rely simply on whether the child is IDEA eligible. Rather,
courts must examine the substance of the student’s chosen claim, paying
specific attention to whether the claim seeks a remedy that the IDEA can actually provide. More specifically, it does not matter whether the IDEA might
provide “some” service or remedy to the student. The question is whether
the IDEA provides the specific service or remedy that a student has been denied or is requesting. In at least three categories of cases, the IDEA is not responsive to the specific claims students are raising: (1) infliction of physical
or emotional harm, (2) exclusion from the educational program, and (3) denials of equal access. In each category, courts should recognize that such
claims are not rooted in IDEA’s FAPE obligation and thus not precluded by
its exhaustion clause.
1.

Infliction of Physical or Emotional Harm

Students with disabilities who have suffered physical or emotional harm
based on their disability often seek money damages for those harms, not a
change in their educational program or compensatory educational services. 287 Were they seeking only equitable relief in the form of modifications
to their educational program, they might be required to exhaust under the
IDEA. 288 But such exhaustion makes no sense when their claim is rooted in
remedying the prior injury itself. More specifically, such claims are not a

285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra note 43.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Part III.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
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product of IDEA’s provision of FAPE but rather purely a form of disabilitybased discrimination. Further, the IDEA does not afford the money damages
these students are seeking. The IDEA is limited to modifications to the educational program and equitable remedies. 289 As a result, IDEA exhaustion
simply does not apply.
Courts can easily recognize such cases by focusing on the facts pled and
avoiding distracting issues pertaining to possible IDEA claims that could
have been raised. For instance, a child may have an IEP that delineates the
parameters for appropriate behavioral interventions. A child injured when a
teacher uses inappropriate restraints may bring a claim under disability
rights laws and seek a remedy of money damages for the injury. Even though
the child could raise a FAPE claim and question the implementation of the
IEP, a claim centered on injury should be segregated from the FAPE issue
and allowed to proceed under disability rights laws. The exhaustion clause is
only triggered when a plaintiff seeks IDEA-based relief. 290 In the hypothetical case in which a child seeks money damages based on a school injury,
courts can feel certain that by allowing the claim to proceed they are giving
effect to the plain language of the exhaustion clause, which was never meant
to block such claims. 291
2.

Exclusion from the Educational Program

Students bringing claims alleging exclusion from the educational program where facts support intentional discrimination are attempting to invoke section 504 and ADA rights and therefore are not required to exhaust
under the IDEA. Such claims arise when schools exclude a student—through
repeated suspensions or repeated removals from class—as a means of targeting them because of their disability. 292 Some courts have recognized that
when plaintiffs plead such facts they are alleging something more than simply a denial of FAPE and have correctly characterized claims alleging exclusion as a form of intentional discrimination outside of the scope of the
IDEA. 293
289. Weber, supra note 86, at 1113.
290. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
291. See K.G. ex rel. Gosch v. Sergeant Bluff-Lufton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 244 F. Supp. 3d 904
(N.D. Iowa 2017) (holding that parents were not required to exhaust claims of excessive force
and disability discrimination when teacher dragged student across classroom floor, causing
injury).
292. See J.S., III ex rel. J.S. Jr. v. Hous. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d 979, 986 (11th Cir.
2017) (holding that allegations that a disabled student was repeatedly removed from class
could not be analyzed simply as a FAPE violation but were “cognizable as a separate [section
504/ADA] claim for intentional discrimination”); see also Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter
Schs., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding plaintiff’s allegations of repeated suspensions and retaliatory calling of EMS or threats to do so were outside the scope of IDEA’s
right to FAPE and more properly represented discrimination claims under section 504/the
ADA).
293. See, e.g., Patrick, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 228.
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Because all three laws contain overlapping protections guaranteeing students with disabilities the right to be educated in the least restrictive environment, courts must carefully scrutinize claims touching on exclusion from
that setting. 294 A child alleging school exclusion could viably bring such a
claim under all three laws. 295 When this type of overlap in rights exists,
courts must guard against an instinct to compel exhaustion whenever a
claim could involve the IDEA’s FAPE obligation. Rather, they must examine
the entirety of facts presented and remedies sought to determine whether the
plaintiff seeks to invoke an antidiscrimination principle enshrined in disability rights laws or the IDEA’s right to FAPE, which includes a right to be educated in the least restrictive environment. 296
A few guiding principles can help courts in this context. First, courts
must identify whether a plaintiff has alleged intent. Facts supporting allegations of intentional action taken because of disability clearly take a complaint
outside the framework of the IDEA. Second, courts must analyze the requested relief. If the plaintiff seeks relief in the form of an injunction or a return to the original placement, the complaint is both rooted in the IDEA and
seeking relief that the IDEA can provide, and thus, exhaustion would be required. If, however, the plaintiff seeks money damages for the harms endured because of exclusion and invokes section 504 or the ADA’s right to
education in the least restrictive environment, such a claim represents the
plaintiff’s legitimate attempt to invoke disability-rights-law principles of
nondiscrimination, is not remediable by the IDEA, and should be allowed to
proceed without exhaustion.
The Supreme Court intentionally punted on the question whether a
plaintiff can circumvent the exhaustion clause by pleading a remedy not
available under the IDEA. 297 Scholars post-Fry have argued both for and
against an interpretation that would allow plaintiffs to bypass the exhaustion
clause by essentially requesting money damages. 298 However, when a plaintiff seeks to remedy harms based in exclusion, they are not simply using
money damages as a way to circumvent the IDEA. Instead, they are invoking
a germinal right enshrined in disability rights laws—the right to be free from
discrimination and to seek a remedy when that right is breached. 299 Thus,

294. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (2019); supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
295. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34; supra note 97 and accompanying text.
296. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34.
297. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 (2017) (“In reaching these conclusions, we leave for another day a further question about the meaning of § 1415(l): Is exhaustion
required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—is not one that an IDEA hearing officer
may award?”).
298. Compare Martha McCarthy, Annotation, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools:
Could This Supreme Court Decision Open a Pandora’s Box?, 344 EDUC. L. REP. 18, 29–30
(2017), and Garda, supra note 18, at 476–77, with Bruce, supra note 18, at 1011.
299. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132–12133.
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because plaintiffs are invoking a right that exists independently outside of
the IDEA and are clearly seeking relief that the IDEA is unable to offer,
courts must allow these claims to proceed without exhaustion. Congress
never intended the exhaustion clause to bar access to remedies unavailable
under the IDEA.
3.

Denial of Equal Access

Students who bring equality-of-access claims are not required to exhaust
under the IDEA. 300 These claims center on section 504’s FAPE regulation,
defined as equal access to the educational program, and, as such, are not
rooted in a denial of IDEA’s individual right to appropriate progress. 301 As
the Fry Court described, a school district may meet its IDEA obligations and
still run afoul of disability rights laws’ promise of equal access. Courts must
recognize claims grounded in equality as viable disability-rights-law claims
not subject to exhaustion. This tenet should hold true even when claims
could only be brought by a student and in a school setting.
Understanding the limits of the IDEA’s FAPE obligation is essential for
courts tasked with disentangling FAPE claims from this category of disability
rights claims. Importantly, the IDEA does not ensure equality. 302 Rather, it
only ensures access to the special education and supportive services necessary to ensure students can make appropriate progress toward annual
goals. 303 Sometimes those services may have the functional effect of moving a
student toward equality. Other times, a school might fully meet its requirements under the IDEA but leave the student with an educational program
that does not provide equal access as compared to nondisabled peers. The
Fry case is an example of such facts. There, the plaintiffs chose not to bring
an IDEA claim because they recognized that the school had met its IDEA obligation to ensure individual progress. 304 The crux of their claim was a right
to an accommodation that would bring their daughter closer to equality with

300. Sophie G. ex rel. Kelly G. v. Wilson Cnty. Schs., 742 F. App’x 73, 78, 80 (6th Cir.
2018) (finding that a plaintiff’s ADA claim, alleging a school district denied her child access to
an after-school childcare program due to the child’s lack of independent toileting ability, did
not require exhaustion: “Looking to the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint—the violations alleged and relief sought—admission to the Kid’s Club is distinct from Sophie’s education, is not
alleged to be necessary for Sophie to receive a FAPE, and is, at most, tangentially related to Sophie’s IEP”).
301. See supra Part IV; see also Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008) (followed in the D.C. Circuit in Torrence v. District of Columbia, 669 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72 (D.D.C.
2009)).
302. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982).
303. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017).
304. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 751–52, 758 (2017).
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her nondisabled peers. 305 A service dog provided her independence in a way
that a human aide could not. 306
Courts can recognize these claims when plaintiffs plead facts to suggest
any form of inequality born out of a difference between students with disabilities and those without. While these claims will center on the educational
program, the framing is central to the court’s analysis. Plaintiffs who invoke
disability rights laws will situate their demands within a framework that calls
for equality of access. Typical allegations will involve a school’s failure to
provide some form of educational support or modification as creating or exacerbating inequity. 307 While plaintiffs in such cases will have rights under
the IDEA, they may recognize (like the Frys) that the school has met the
IDEA’s FAPE obligations, but an inequity remains. Such demands invoke
rights only available through section 504 and the ADA; therefore these
claims do not invoke IDEA rights and should not be subject to exhaustion
requirements.
A subset of equal-access claims includes plaintiffs seeking to invoke the
ADA’s effective-communication regulation. 308 This regulation demands that
schools “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities
are as effective as communications with others.” 309 Here again, the obligation
owed students is grounded in not the IDEA’s right to individualized progress
but rather a comparative right to equality. Thus, plaintiffs invoking the
ADA’s effective-communication requirement, even those with IEPs, should
not be forced to exhaust their claims under the IDEA. The IDEA simply contains no basis to remedy an equality claim.
CONCLUSION
Disability rights laws promise an environment free from discrimination
where students with disabilities have equal access to educational opportunity. But too often, courts incorrectly restrict students’ access to this promise.
Courts instead view the IDEA as the sole arbiter of all education-related
challenges involving students with disabilities, failing to recognize that the
law has real limits. These limits are what make access to section 504 and the
ADA essential. For some, the promise of equality, freedom from discrimina-

305. Id. at 751–52.
306. Id. at 751; see also Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 41.
307. Supra Part III.
308. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2019); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist.,
725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).
308. Hocker, supra note 1, at 85, 92.
309. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). “For purposes of this section, ‘companion’ means a family
member, friend, or associate of an individual seeking access to a service, program, or activity of
a public entity, who, along with such individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public entity should communicate.” Id. § 35.160(a)(2).
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tion, and the ability to attain both are only found within these disability
rights laws.
Courts must acknowledge the full scope of the rights embodied in section 504 and the ADA and stop needlessly restricting students’ ability to invoke their remedies. As a first step, courts must recognize that these laws’
distinct FAPE rights are not cognizable under the IDEA and therefore not
restricted by the IDEA’s exhaustion clause. To avoid needless restriction of
disability rights law claims, courts should disaggregate claims, separating
cases involving students only eligible under disability rights laws from cases
involving dually eligible students. Cases under the first category never require plaintiffs to exhaust before proceeding. Courts must pay special attention to cases in the second category and unpack the type of disability barrier
alleged as well as the remedy sought. By doing so, courts can ensure plaintiffs’ disability rights claims are fairly adjudicated. Congress intended plaintiffs to have access to these important laws and courts must ensure this
promise is kept.

